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CSID EMAIL BULLETIN –April 9, 2007
FROM CSID:
The Rights of Women in Islam
and Muslim Societies
Pre-registration deadline: April 13
EVENTS AND REPORTS:
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Three Satellite Conversations with Tariq Ramadan (April 10-12, 2007)
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Labor Standards, Human Rights, Democracy: The Role of the World Bank and IMF (April 12)
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The Community of Democracies: Protecting Standards (April 12)
ARTICLES:
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Imam Leads First Prayer By Muslim Cleric On Texas Senate Floor (Associated Press)
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Egypt – Constitutional Autocracy (Washington Post Editorial)
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Pakistani Political Strife Prompts Action Among Emigres (by Pamela Constable)
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Hear out the Muslim Brotherhood (by Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata)
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Islamist diversity is al- Qaeda’s enemy (by Abdel Monem Said Aly)
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What We Can Learn From Britain About Iran (by Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh)
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Geopolitical Diary: Is the al-Sadrite Movement Imploding? (stratfor.com)
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Syrias Chalabi: From Washington to Damascus ( by Salim Abraham)
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Islamophobia: A Call to Confronting a Creeping Disease (by Louay Safi)
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Former U.S. diplomat interprets Islam (by Sam Howe Verhovek)
ANNOUNCEMENTS:
Dear Friends, Brothers, Sisters, and Colleagues :
We hope you willhonor us with your presence and participationin this EXCITING INTERNATIONAL conference on Friday, April 27, 2007 atGeorge Washington University in Washington DC. You may view the final program and register for the conference ONLINE at: http://www.csid-online.org/
The deadline forthe discounted pre-registrationrates is April 13, 2007. Youmay registerby mail or online at: http://www.csid-online.org/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=372
Please forward this announcement and invitation to anyonewho you think might be interested in attending this conference.
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY
The Rights of Women in Islam
and Muslim Societies
Eighth Annual Conference
Jack Morton Auditorium George Washington University
GW Media and Public Affairs Building, First Floor
Foggy Bottom-GWU Metro (Orange and Blue Lines)
TENTATIVE PROGRAM
Friday, April 27, 2007
8:00 a.m. 8:30 a.m. Registration
8:30 a.m. 9:00 a.m. Welcoming Remarks
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Dr. Asma Afsaruddin, Chair, Program Committee
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Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, CSID President
9:00 a.m. 10:30 a.m. Session 1
Discourses on Women’s and Human Rights
Chair: Tamara Sonn
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Mixing Morality and Politics and its Impact on Womens Human Rights
Ingrid Sandole-Staroste, Adjunct Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Women Studies Program, Istaroste@aol.com
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The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Preliminary Assessment of its Positions on Religious Freedom, Women and Religious Minorities
Alejandro Beutel, Minaret Freedom Institute, alejandro.beutel@gmail.com
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The Development of Islamic Feminism: Emancipation of Women; Opportunities towards the development of Democracy and Universal Human Rights
Shajeda Dewan , UniversityCollegeLondon, shajeda.dewan@hotmail.co.uk
10:30 a.m. – 11:00 a.m. Break
11:00 a.m. 12:30 p.m. Session 2
The Rights of Women and Minorities
Chair: Mariam Memarsadeghi
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Women and Judicial Decision-Making: The Status and Role of Women in Judiciary in Iran
Reza Eslami Somea, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Tehran University, Iran, somea1@yahoo.com
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The rights of women and minorities in islam and muslim societies
Sanae EL Mellouki, Student at Mohammed V University Faculty of Humanities, RABAT, Sanaeelmellouki@yahoo.com
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Challenges Facing Women Human Rights Defenders
Archana Pyati, Senior Associate, Human Rights Defenders Program, Human Rights First, PyatiA@humanrightsfirst.org
12:30 p.m. 2:30 p.m. Jumah Prayer and Lunch
2:30 a.m. 4:00 p.m. Session 3
Islamic Feminisms: Rereading Texts and Tradition
Chair: Margot Badran
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Reclaiming their rights through Islam: Islamist feminism in Turkey
Negar Razavi, Council on Foreign Relations, nrazavi@cfr.org
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Revolution from Within
Christina Sommers, Resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C, Sommers22@aol.com
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Fundamentalism, Gender, and the Discourses of Veiling (Hijab) in Contemporary Iran
Fatemeh Sadeghi, Assistant lecturer, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran, sadegif@yahoo.com
4:00 p.m. 4:30 p.m. Break
4:30 a.m. 6:00 p.m. Session 4
Women’s Political and Social Empowerment
Chair: Azizah al-Hibri
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Spiritual Capital of Politically Engaged Women in Kuwait
Alessandra Gonz√°lez, Sociology Graduate Program, Baylor University, Alessandra_Gonzalez@baylor.edu
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Engaging Muslim Women in Civic and Social Change: the Canadian Experience
Nuzhat Jafri and Salima Ebrahim, Canadian Council of Muslim Women (CCMW), nuzhat.jafri@rogers.com and salima.ebrahim-alumni@lse.ac.uk
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Islamic Womens Activism In UAE Civil Society
Wanda Krause, Department of Political Science at the University of. Guelph, Canada,W.Krause@exeter.ac.uk
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Changing Patterns of Madrasa Education for Women: An Inside Story of Madrasas in Karachi Pakistan
Dr. Abdul Aziz Dinar, Education Officer, ITREB Karachi, Pakistan, abdulazizdinar@yahoo.com
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How do traditional views on women and gender roles affect women s participation in the political and economic spheres?
Christina Tobias-Nahi, Director of Public Affairs, Islamic Relief, cnahi@irw.org
7:00 p.m. 9:30 p.m. Annual Banquet Dinner
(Washington Marriott Hotel, 1221 22nd Street)
Invited Banquet Keynote Speakers:
Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs
Keith Ellison, U.S. Congressman
Shirin Ebadi, Iranian Democracy and Human Rights Activist
CSIDs Eighth Annual Conference
The Rights of Women and Minorities in Islam and Muslim Societies
Friday, April 27, 2007
Jack Morton Auditorium George Washington University
805 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052
Foggy Bottom-GWU Metro (Orange and Blue Lines)
Registration Form
Name & Title:_______________________________________
Institution:_________________________________________
Address:___________________________________________
City: ______________State_______________ Zip: _________
Tel.:______________________________________________
Fax: _______________________ E- mail:_________________
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Pre-Registration By April 13 |
On-site Registration After April 13 |
Registration Without Dinner |
Banquet Dinner Only |
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□ $60.00 |
□ $90.00 |
□ $50.00 |
□ $ 40.00 |
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Non-Member |
□ $100.00 |
□ $150.00 |
□ $80.00 |
□ $ 70.00 |
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A Couple |
□ $140.00 |
□ $180.00 |
□ $110.00 |
□$ 100.00 |
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Student |
□ $ 30.00 |
□ $40.00 |
□ $20.00 |
□ $ 20.00 |
Registration includes continental breakfast, banquet dinner, and coffee breaks. Registration includes the Banquet Dinner, but does not include lodging or lunch. Payment must be received by Friday April 13 to qualify for pre-registration rates.
To register online click here: https://secure.entango.com/donate/6gHYxfvsaMJ
Otherwise, please mail registration form with payment to: CSID Conf. Registration- 1625 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Suite 601, Washington, D.C. 20036
For further information, please visit our website www.csid-online.org and contact CSID Conference Coordinator, Sherif Mansour, at: sherif@islam-democracy.org or call (202) 265-1200.
Islam-West Relations:
Three Satellite Conversations with Tariq Ramadan
April 10-12, 2007, 10:30am-12:00pm
Gaston Hall, Georgetown University
37th & O Streets, NW
Open to the Public
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Islam and Democracy, Tuesday, April 10
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Muslim Minorities in Western Europe, Wednesday, April 11
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Catholic-Muslim Relations, Thursday, April 12
Tariq Ramadan is one of the world’s leading Muslim intellectuals and a Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. A Swiss citizen of Egyptian descent, he advocates a self-confident Islam that both engages and critiques Western ideas and institutions.
The Visa Controversy: Since July 2004 Tariq Ramadan has been unable to enter the United States. Shortly before he was to take up a position at Notre Dame,
Ramadan’s visa was revoked under the “ideological exclusion” provision of the Patriot Act.
The Event: From a BBC studio in London Ramadan will present his ideas and respond to questions. To learn more about Ramadan and the visa controversy and to post questions for the event, visit http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu
IMF Spring Meetings – April 2007
Labor Standards, Human Rights, Democracy: The Role of the World Bank and IMF
Date: Thursday, April 12
Time: 10.30am 12.00pm
Place: World Bank complex, Room MC-C1-100
This year the World Bank is seeking its fifteenth International Development Assistance replenishment, while the IMF is undertaking a major review and discussion regarding its purpose and future mission. The view of the Funds management is contained in The Managing Directors Report on Implementing the Funds Medium-Term Strategy (April 2006). These developments create an opportunity for reflecting upon the mission and activities of the World Bank and the IMF. The current session will explore the question of what is the role and relationship of the Bank and Fund to the questions of labor standards, human rights, and democracy.
RSVP: mail@thomaspalley.com
Speakers:
Peter Bakvis, Director, Washington Office, International Trade Union Confederation
Robert Holzmann, Director, Social Protection Department, World Bank
Armand Pereira, Director, Washington Office, International Labor Organization
Thomas Palley, Economics for Democratic & Open Societies, Washington DC
IMF representative invited
The Community of Democracies: Protecting Standards
Please join us for the release of the final reports of the International Advisory Committee (IAC) for the Community of Democracies invitations process
Thursday, April 12, 2007
2:00-3:30 p.m.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Root Room
1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington D.C.
Speakers:
Morton Halperin
Member of the IAC and Director U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute
Ambassador Mark Palmer
Member of the IAC and Vice-Chairman, Freedom House
Ambassador Abdoulaye Diop
Malian Ambassador to the United States and Chair, Community of Democracies
Moderators:
Ted Piccone
Executive Director, Democracy Coalition Project, and Coordinator of IAC Secretariat
Thomas Melia
Deputy Executive Director, Freedom House, and Team Leader of IAC Secretariat
This event will present the recommendations of the International Advisory Committee (IAC) to the Community of Democracies (CD), highlighting those countries that should be invited to join the CDs biennial ministerial meeting this November in Bamako, Mali as participants or observers, and those that should not be invited at all.
The Community of Democracies is a global association of states committed to upholding and defending democratic principles and practices. To support the invitation process, the International Advisory Committee, composed of independent high-level experts from around the world, was established to assess the quality of democracy in countries aspiring to join or belonging to the Community of Democracies.
Please RSVP by April 10 to (202) 721-5630 or info@demcoalition.org
ASIA SOCIETY REPORT:
ENGAGE OR OPPOSE POLITICAL ISLAMISM?
by Mithre J. Sandrasagra
IPS – Inter Press Service News Agency
Thursday, 22 March 2007
http://cosmicfantasia.com/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1180
The question of whether opposition or engagement with political Islam is the better way forward for the United States in Asia was the focus of a panel discussion sponsored by the Asia Society here Tuesday.
“Non-violent Islamists, those who pursue a state and society based on Islamic sharia law, ought to be engaged by the U.S. government rather than opposed,” Radwan A. Masmoudi, president of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a Washington-based think-tank, told those gathered. (IPS) – The question of whether opposition or engagement with political Islam is the better way forward for the United States in Asia was the focus of a panel discussion sponsored by the Asia Society here Tuesday.
“Non-violent Islamists, those who pursue a state and society based on Islamic sharia law, ought to be engaged by the U.S. government rather than opposed,” Radwan A. Masmoudi, president of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID), a Washington-based think-tank, told those gathered.
Sadanand Dhume, a fellow of the Asia Society, “disagree[d] forcefully.”
Dhume made the case that in the long run, U.S. interests lie in fostering secularism and enlightenment in Muslim Asia. He argued that Islamic societies must be held to the same standards of pluralism and human rights as the rest of the world, and that the ideology of Islamism is the biggest hurdle toward achieving this goal{/styleboxjp}.
“All Islamists — both those who use terrorism and those who renounce it — must be opposed,” stressed Dhume.
Islamism is a term that has been used to describe a set of political ideologies holding that Islam is not solely a religion, but also a political system where Islamic law is the basis for all laws of society, and that Muslims must return to the original teachings and the early models of Islam.
This usage, however, is controversial. People who are labeled Islamists oppose the term because it suggests their philosophy is a political extrapolation from Islam rather than a straightforward expression of Islam as a way of life.
According to Masmoudi, it is hard for Muslims to separate religion and politics.
“All Muslims believe that the Koran is the literal word of God, and the Koran talks about political, economic and social issues,” Masmoudi explained.
“When Muslims are engaged and participate in the political process they become more moderate, more pragmatic — as can be seen in Turkey, Indonesia and Malaysia,” said Masmoudi. “But the opposite is also true, when Muslims are excluded, oppressed or repressed by their own governments, they of course become more violent, more radical.”
Asked what steps the U.S. could take in moving forward, Masmoudi told IPS: “Throughout the Muslim world I think the U.S. needs to do two things: support the process of democracy and democratisation, and make it very clear that the U.S. will not support dictators and oppressive regimes and rulers.”
“In the process of democracy we must partner with everyone: secular groups, Islamic groups, religious groups. The U.S. message has to be: we support democracy and we engage with everybody,” Masmoudi added.
Masmoudi rejected the idea that U.S. support for authoritarian, yet friendly, regimes serves U.S. interests and highlighted the growing suspicion among Muslim populations of U.S. claims to support democracy at all.
Democracy can make significant inroads if freedom of the press, free market economies, freedom of religion and association, and judicial systems that respect the rule of law are encouraged, Masmoudi said.
“Extremism can’t survive where there is free discussion and debate. The biggest mistake that the U.S. can make is to say we are not going to talk to the Islamists, or that we are going to consider them all our enemies,” he stressed.
“The way to modernisation is through re-interpretation of the texts,” Masmoudi said, emphasising that, “how the problem of reinterpretation is reconciled will be different in each country.”
The U.S. should treat political reform the way it does economic reform and require timetables, Masmoudi suggested.
In addition, the U.S. should support political participation of moderate Islamic parties in order to provide a legal outlet for grievances and refrain from radicalisation of the parties through exclusion.
On the other hand, in making the case for a secular strategy, Dhume told IPS: “We must recognise that there are good ideas and bad ideas, we don’t need to surround these ideas with discussions of sensitivity.”
“Modernisation requires giving things up that are dear to you,” Dhume said, stressing that it is unwise to believe that “seventh century texts and practices can some how supply us with answers to all problems that we face in twentieth century life.”
Islamists are endeavouring to “insert religion into every sphere of human activity,” according to Dhume.
“You see this across Asia in everything from how women dress, to how banks calculate interest. In Malaysia you see it in separate supermarket lines for men and women. In Aceh, Indonesia, you see it in public floggings and anti-vice squads. In parts of Pakistan you see it in attempts to ban popular music and women on billboards.”
Dhume argues that “Islamism represents a set of ideas that are repressive, retrograde and fundamentally at odds with modern notions of individualism, free inquiry and pluralism.”
“These ideas attempt to sequester Muslims and place them outside the reach of the progress that we have made over the past several centuries as human beings, especially in terms of women’s rights and the rights of religious minorities,” he continued.
Dhume warned that, “In terms of goals and aspirations there is in fact no sharp break between violent Islamists — such as al Qaeda or Jamai Islamia in Southeast Asia — and their non-violent counterparts — groups like the Jamaat-e-Islami Party in Pakistan, the Islamic Party of Malaysia or the Justice and Prosperity Party in Indonesia.”
“In the long run the best defence against terrorism lies in fostering secularism and enlightenment in Muslim Asia,” Dhume stressed.
This enlightenment, he suggests, includes avoiding the pitfalls of blind, race-to-the-bottom democratisation and recognising that Islamic societies must be held to the same standards as the rest of the world.
U.S. President George W. Bush has said that Indonesia, the world’s most populous majority-Muslim nation, is an example of how democracy and modernisation can provide an alternative to extremism.
Although acknowledging a fledgling democracy and free presidential elections in Indonesia, Dhume, in a recent Voice of America interview, pointed out that, “If you are a minority today in Indonesia, you have never been as unsafe.”
“If you want to go and pray in your church or in your temple, you have never been as unsafe in the last twenty years as you are today, because what could happen is that a [Islamist] mob could decide that your church was, for example, illegally constructed and they could come and shut it down, and there is no authority that is willing to take them on,” Dhume said.
Dhume believes that the U.S. decision on what moderate Islam looks like, “how we think Indonesia ought to look in 2020,” is going to make a very big difference.
“They know what their end goal is. And I think the only way to stop that end goal from becoming a reality is by having a clear sense of what the alternative end goal is,” he said, emphasising that the alternative is secular democracy where there is room for Islamists to participate, but “certainly one where their threat is kept in mind.”
“This issue is vital to our national security interests here in the U.S.,” U.S. Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke told IPS following the panel discussion.
“I think that the U.S. needs to dramatically improve its policies of public diplomacy and communications with the Muslim world, not to change Muslim societies, but to create better relations between us and the Muslims,” said Holbrooke, who served as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. under former President Bill Clinton and who now serves as chairman of the Asia Society.
“We have to improve now. This is a great problem right now,” he stressed.
RAND REPORT:
Building Moderate Muslim Networks
Monday, March 26, 2007
http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG574/
Just as it fought the spread of Communism during the Cold War, the United States must do more to develop and support networks of moderate Muslims who are too often silenced by violent radical Islamists, according to a RAND Corporation report issued today.
The struggle in much of the Muslim world today is a war of ideas, said Angel Rabasa, a RAND senior policy analyst and the lead author of the report. This is not a war of civilizations; its not Islam versus the West. Its a struggle within Islam to define the character of Islam.
We cannot come in as outsiders, as a non-Muslim country, and discredit the radicals ideology, Rabasa said. Muslims have to do that themselves. What we can do is level the playing field by empowering the moderates.
Rather than an afterthought, the building of moderate Muslim networks needs to become an explicit goal of U.S. government policy, with an international database of partners, a well-designed plan and feedback loops to keep it on track, according to the study.
The report by RAND, a nonprofit research organization, is intended to serve as a road map to build these networks and to serve as a practical guide for policymakers to implement.
Rabasa said the United States has a critical role to play in aiding moderate Muslims, and can learn much from the way it addressed the spread of Communism during the Cold War. The efforts of the United States and its allies to build free and democratic networks and institutions provided an organizational and ideological counter force to Communist groups seeking to come to power through political groups, labor unions, youth and student organizations and other groups.
Broad parallels stand out between the Cold War environment and the situation in the Muslim world today.
At the beginning of the Cold War, the threat was a global Communist movement led by a nuclear-armed Soviet Union; today it is a global jihadist movement striking against the West with acts of mass-casualty terrorism, the report notes. In both cases, policymakers recognized that the United States and its allies were engaged in an ideological conflict that had to be contested across diplomatic, economic, military and psychological dimensions.
But unlike the Cold War, this battle involves shadowy groups rather than a single entity. These radical Islamic groups control no territory, reject the norms of the international system and are not subject to normal means of deterrence. Many of these groups have been organizing for decades and have access to vast amounts of money, Rabasa said.
The radical groups are fighting to create religious states based on Sharia, or Islamic law. They typically reject liberal Western values such as democracy, gender equality and the right of religious minorities to publicly practice their faith.
Many Muslim countries are ruled by authoritarian political structures and the mosque is one of the few places people can protest harsh political, economic and social conditions, the study says. Radical Islamists have seized the opportunity to promote their interpretation of Islam as a solution to those problems, aggressively spreading their views in the mass media and via the Internet.
Moderates by definition are not aggressive, Rabasa said. These radicals are much more willing to go the extra mile and use violent means to enforce their views. Moderates are in the majority, but the radicals tend to intimidate the moderates by accusing them of being agents of the West or not true Muslims. Radicals have also threatened physical violence and have forced many people into silence, hiding or fleeing their countries.
One of the challenges for the United States will be identifying genuine moderates from those who may appear to be moderate, but in fact advocate ideas that are inconsistent with democratic values, the report states.
Characterisics of moderate Muslims include : support for democracy, internationally recognized human rights including gender equality and freedom of worship; acceptance of nonsectarian sources of law; and opposition to terrorism.
Instead of focusing on the Middle East, where most of the radical Islamic thought originates and is firmly entrenched, the report recommends reaching out to activists, leaders and intellectuals in Turkey, Southeast Asia, Europe and other open societies. The goal of this outreach would be to reverse the flow of ideas and have more democratic ideas flow back to the less fertile ground for moderate network-building of the Middle East.
Partners in this network-building effort should be those who share key dimensions of democratic culture, the study says. The report recommends targeting five groups as potential building blocks for networks: liberal and secular Muslim academics and intellectuals; young moderate religious scholars; community activists; womensgroups engaged in gender equality campaigns; and moderate journalists and scholars.
As America learned during the Cold War, moderate groups can lose credibility and therefore, effectiveness if U.S. support is too obvious. Effective tactics that worked during the Cold War include having the groups led by credible individuals and having the United States maintain some distance from the organizations it supports.
This was done by not micro-managing the groups, but by giving them enough autonomy, Rabasa said. As long as certain guidelines were met, they were free to pursue their own activities.
To help start this initiative, the report recommends working toward an international conference modeled in the Cold War-era Congress of Cultural Freedom, and then developing a standing organization to combat radical Islamism.
Besides Rabasa, the authors of the report include Cheryl Benard and Lowell H. Schwartz, both of RAND, and Peter Sickle, a Ph.D. candidate at George Washington University, who served as a summer associate at RAND. The report, titled Building Moderate Muslim Networks, is available on the RAND Web site at www.rand.org
Learn More:
Full Document: http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG574/
http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG574.pdf
IMAM LEADS FIRST PRAYER BY MUSLIM CLERIC ON TEXAS SENATE FLOOR
Associated Press, 4/5/07
http://www.news8austin.com/content/your_news/default.asp?ArID=181962
A Dallas-area imam became the first Muslim cleric to offer the Texas Senate’s daily prayer on Wednesday.
The visit raised the eyebrows of a conservative talk-show host turned senator who questioned the religious leader’s background and the timing of his visit.
Sen. Dan Patrick stepped off the floor for Imam Yusuf Kavakci’s prayer, in which he recited a passage from the Koran in Arabic and read an English translation.
“I surely believe that everyone should have the right to speak, but I didn’t want my attendance on the floor to appear that I was endorsing that,” said Patrick, a freshman Republican from Houston.
Patrick later gave a short speech on the Senate floor in which he called Kavakci’s prayer an “extraordinary moment” that underscores that America is a nation “so tolerant of others we bend over backwards to allow others to pray as they wish.”
He pointed out that other countries would not do the same for Christians and Jews, who are observing Easter and Passover this week.
Kavakci said he can’t understand why anyone would have a problem with his prayer or with the text he chose, which he said spoke generically about the mercy of God. He said he does not know Patrick or understand why he would criticize him.
“For my perspective as a Muslim, we are all brothers and sisters and children of Adam and Eve as we say,” Kavakci said. “For us there is no problem really.”
MAURITANIA’S BIG LESSON
Hassan Nafaa
Al Ahram, 22-28 March 2007, www.ahram.org.eg/weekly
Cairo – Mauritania is a breath of fresh air. As the second round of presidential elections concludes, the country is set to welcome its new freely-elected president. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall will be peacefully and voluntarily replaced – a far cry from everything that is happening elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world. Less than two years after the coup that ended the dictatorship, Mauritania is turning into a democratic and free country.
Chairman Vall of the Military Council for Freedom and Democracy, who unseated President Maaouya Oould Sid Ahmed Taya on 3 August 2005, had told his nation that he wasn’t seeking power or wealth and that all the military wanted was to remove the obstacles to democracy. He promised not to remain in power one day more than is necessary. Of course, no one believed him. But he was telling the truth.
One month after the coup, Vall pardoned all political detainees so as to help revive the country’s political system and encourage exiled politicians to come home. As soon as the Mauritanian political scene began recovering, the ruling Military Council started cleaning up the 1991 constitution, removing all provisions that may impede political life. The presidential term was reduced to five years instead of seven, with a maximum of two consecutive terms in office. Candidates over 75 years of age were disqualified. And 20 per cent of all elected councils were earmarked for women. The amendments were approved in a referendum in June 2006.
Although the above reforms were necessary for democratisation, they didn’t dispel all lingering doubts. So the Military Council took two further measures: first, it deprived the members of the council and the government from the right to run for office for the entire transitional period; and second, it formed an independent committee to supervise the elections, in which civil society groups and international organisations were represented. Because of such measures, the council was able to complete the transitional phase in 19 months instead of the 24 months it had promised.
The Mauritanian story is relevant to us in two ways: in the way the military relates to the political regime, and in the way countries that are at the periphery of the Arab regional system are conducting their affairs. Contrary to conventional wisdom in the Arab world, the Mauritanian accomplishment proves that the military can be a force for democracy. Also contrary to conventional wisdom, it seems that peripheral countries can be more progressive in their outlook than core countries.
I cannot discuss the complex relation between the military and Arab regimes within the scope of this article. But we mustn’t underestimate the patriotism and concern the military has exhibited in several instances in the past. The mere mention of Ahmed Orabi or Gamal Abdel-Nasser evokes memories of times when the military stood by the nation in a relentless quest for freedom, democracy and unity. Ironically, the military often turned into a burden for, every so often, the military would succumb to the temptations of power, staying in office indefinitely, and justifying its monopoly on power by exaggerating internal and external perils. Repeatedly, the military engaged in external adventures or domestic struggles without thinking of the consequences, behaviour that was as regrettable as it was catastrophic.
Before Mauritania, there had only been one case in which the military stepped down voluntarily in favour of a civilian government. That was the case of Siwar Al-Dahab in Sudan. This makes the Mauritanian experience all the more relevant. Indeed, it may turn out to be a harbinger of things to come. I have a feeling that we’ll see other cases in which the military would act as an incubator for democracy. My reasons for thinking so are: first, the Arab region is experiencing the kind of uncertainty and despair that may culminate in uncontrollable chaos and instability; second, there is a lack of organised and trustworthy groups that can propose an alternative political vision, rally public support, and conduct a peaceful transition of power; and third, the public is dismayed with the conventional role of the military and hoping for a change that may initiate a process of democratisation.
In other words, the Arab public is ready for a repeat of the Mauritanian experience. It is ready for a limited intervention by the army to restore pluralism and democratisation. Mauritania has a population of 30.5 million and an area of one million square kilometres, mostly desert land. Most of the population lives off sheep and cattle breeding, and 40 per cent are classified as poor. Mauritania was accepted in the Arab League in 1973, many years after it gained its independence in 1960. That’s how peripheral it is. To this day, many are not even aware Mauritania is an Arab country. And yet it has dared to break the mould.
The time of “key countries” offering uncontested leadership in this region is over. Now the inspiration tends to come from countries that take the first step and never look back. We used to think that “core” countries would lead the way. Now the opposite is true. Peripheral countries are getting there first while older and bigger nations keep plodding aimlessly along. Think of the Emirates and its booming business scene. Think of Qatar and its flourishing media. Think of Lebanon and its defiant resistance. Are we to expect future changes in the Arab world to come from the periphery rather than the core? It’s too early to say, but Mauritania may not be the last small country to give us a big lesson.
* Hassan Nafaa is a professor of political science at Cairo University. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.
EGYPT JUDGES REJECT REFERENDUM RESULTS
Tue Mar 27, 7:51 AM ET
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070327/wl_afp/egyptconstitution
CAIRO (AFP) – Judges in Egypt on Tuesday rejected the results of a referendum on constitutional changes which they argued was fraudulent, and vowed to boycott the supervision of future polls.
“The judges wash their hands of the referendum results,” Ahmed Sabr, a spokesman for the Judges’ Club, told AFP about Monday’s ballot. “We will no longer be a fig leaf to cover something shameful.”
The government said 75 percent of voters approved controversial amendments to the constitution that the regime says will strengthen democracy and fight terrorism.
The official turnout was put at 27 percent of the 35-million-strong electorate, but opposition and independent monitors said the real figure was probably below 10 percent.
Before it was amended the constitution stipulated that elections be supervised by judges, but Sabr said their task was made impossible by the number of polling stations and official interference.
Judges at 334 main polling stations were also expected to each oversee 190 to 300 branch offices where much of the voting took place, Sabr said.
“The head of the high election committee (the justice minister) issued instructions forbidding judges from touring the polling stations,” he said.
“When a number of judges were prevented from moving around in Menufiyah and South Sinai provinces, they gave up and quit their polling stations.”
He also cited cases in which polling stations observed by judges to have empty ballot boxes would suddenly be filled with votes when they returned an hour later.
Several independent rights groups also denounced irregularities in the referendum.
Egypt’s judges gained nationwide attention when they publicly announced that fraud had marred 2005 elections.
Under the new amendments judicial oversight of elections is reduced.
EGYPT’S DEMOCRATS FEELING BETRAYED
By Liz Sly
Tribune foreign correspondent
Published March 28, 2007
CAIRO — In the heady aftermath of the Iraq invasion, President Bush outlined a bold and ambitious U.S. strategy to democratize the Arab world in which Egypt was expected to play a leading role.
“The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way toward peace in the Middle East and now should show the way toward democracy in the Middle East,” Bush told the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003.
A few years later, Egypt instead seems to be leading the region backward by jailing dissenters and opponents and by introducing a slew of constitutional amendments that democracy activists say will herald an end to Egypt’s brief experiment with democratic freedoms.
Disappointment with U.S.
As Egypt’s government announced Tuesday that 75 percent of voters approved the amendments in Monday’s referendum, Egyptian democracy activists said they felt betrayed by a U.S. government that appears to have turned its back on hopes for democracy in the region.
“American policy has decided stability is more important than democracy,” said George Ishaq, one of the founding leaders of the opposition Kifaya movement that flourished after Egypt’s government appeared to bow to U.S. pressure and permit greater pluralism in 2005. “This is the end for democracy in Egypt.”
The amendments will, among other measures, put an end to independent judicial oversight of elections, restrict the formation of political parties and give the government powers to arrest, search and eavesdrop on citizens without a court order — steps in contradiction to a list of measures outlined by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in a speech at the American University of Cairo in 2005 that urged the government to adopt democratic reforms.
Turnout was 27 percent of Egypt’s 36 million voters, the government said. Opposition leaders and human-rights groups, however, put the number who showed up at the polls at 3 percent to 5 percent, most of them state employees, and alleged widespread vote rigging and ballot stuffing.
U.S. criticisms of the backsliding on Egypt’s reform promises have been relatively mild. In Washington, State Department spokesman Tom Casey called the amendments “something of a missed opportunity to advance reform.”
“It is evident that the vast majority of Egyptians chose not to participate in this referendum,” he said, noting the discrepancies between the official turnout figure and reports by others of empty polling stations. “As the Middle East is moving forward toward greater openness and pluralism, we do want to see Egypt play a leading role in that process.”
On a visit to Egypt last weekend, Rice said that she raised “concerns” with President Hosni Mubarak about the amendments, which Amnesty International has called the greatest threat to freedoms in Egypt since Mubarak came to power in 1981.
Opposition figures who had been galvanized by Rice’s earlier encouragements of democratic reform say they wish America would do more to pressure Egypt, which remains one of Washington’s closest Arab allies and the biggest beneficiary of U.S. aid after Israel, to the tune of $1.75 billion a year.
Washington‘s push for democratic reforms in Egypt turned out to be “just words,” said Judge Hisham Bastawisi, an outspoken critic of the existing electoral process.
‘Turned its back’
“It’s not so much that we believed America was genuine about democracy, but there was a belief that U.S. interests happened to coincide with the need for democracy in Egypt,” he said. “It’s because American interests have now changed that the U.S. has turned its back on reforms, and our government has taken advantage of this.”
Hala Mustafa, editor of Democracy magazine, said she does not believe America has lost sight of its dream of a democratic Middle East. But events elsewhere in the region have shifted Washington’s focus for now, she said.
Iraq‘s slide into a chaotic state and fears that the disorder will spill over into the region have pushed the quest for stability to the top of U.S. priorities.
The victory of Hamas in last year’s Palestinian elections and the realization that the banned Islamic fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood had emerged as the single biggest challenger to Egypt’s government after parliamentary elections in 2005 also prompted the U.S. to put on hold its push for democracy in the region, Mustafa said.
Yet although the new constitutional amendments may achieve the government’s immediate goal of silencing dissent, in the long term they could prove highly destabilizing, Mustafa said.
“In the short term this will pass, but in the long term the regime will face many challenges because it will have to resort to security measures to keep the status quo, and this is not a solution,” she said.
In the meantime, U.S. credibility has been severely damaged, said Ishaq, who says democracy activists will continue to try to challenge the government. “I don’t listen to America anymore,” he said. “Even if they come up with a concrete plan, I won’t listen.”
EGYPT – CONSTITUTIONAL AUTOCRACY
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak enshrines his authority to steal elections. The Bush administration applauds.
Washington Post Editorial
Sunday, March 25, 2007; Page B06
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/24/AR2007032400753.html
DURING a brief political opening in 2005 Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak promised to devote his next presidential term to modernizing and liberalizing the Egyptian political system. He did so largely to please the Bush administration, which then was calling on Egypt to “lead the way” in the democratization of the Middle East. The septuagenarian president was worried that Washington might object to his plan to extend his tenure in office, which began in 1981, by another six years.
Shortly after his “reelection” in a rigged vote, Mr. Mubarak began retreating on his promise. He jailed his challenger in the election, liberal democrat Ayman Nour; rigged parliamentary elections; and began a crackdown on opponents — not just the Muslim Brotherhood but secular democrats and liberal bloggers. The Bush administration’s initial protests slowly faded as opponents of President Bush’s freedom agenda at the State Department assumed control over policy toward Egypt.
The administration’s weakness has emboldened the aging autocrat. In late December he unveiled a series of constitutional amendments that purport to follow through on his 2005 promise but in fact do the opposite. Last Monday they were rubber-stamped by the parliament; the next day Mr. Mubarak abruptly announced that the referendum needed to ratify them would be held six days later. No one believes that tomorrow’s vote will be free or fair, and opposition parties have announced a boycott.
The package essentially will make the “emergency laws” that have underpinned Mr. Mubarak’s regime a permanent part of Egypt’s political order. One amendment would write into the constitution the authority of police to carry out arrests, search homes, conduct wiretaps and open mail without a warrant and would give the president the authority to order civilians tried by military courts, where they have limited rights.
Other amendments would ban independent political candidates as well as parties based on religion, which would eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from parliament. Only parties with parliamentary representation would be able to nominate presidential candidates; since the government has refused to register most opposition parties and rigged parliamentary elections, there would be no alternative to the ruling party’s choice.
The opposition and outside groups such as Amnesty International and Freedom House have rightly described the amendments as the greatest setback to freedom in Egypt in a quarter-century. Yet the Bush administration has barely reacted. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who is visiting Egypt this weekend, said Friday that “it’s disappointing” that Egypt hasn’t proved to be a leader of liberalization. But the State Department is downplaying the constitutional amendments. While acknowledging some “concerns,” a spokesman said last week that “a process of political reform has begun in Egypt” and that “you have to put this in the wider context.”
Here’s the wider context: The Bush administration used its considerable leverage over Egypt to force some initial steps toward democratic change two years ago. Then it slowly reversed itself and now has come full circle, once again embracing a corrupt autocracy. It’s a shameful record, and one that Egyptians — who, then as now, mostly despise their government — won’t quickly forget.
DEMOCRACY DEMOTION IN EGYPT:
Is the United States a Willing Accomplice?
By Andrew Exum and Zack Snyder
March 23, 2007
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=
On December 26, 2006, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak proposed a package of amendments to the Egyptian constitution with the purported aim of introducing more democratic freedom into Egypt’s sclerotic political system. In effect, however, these “reforms” will serve only to strengthen the ruling party’s stranglehold on Egyptian politics and send Egypt farther down the road toward authoritarian rule. On Monday, March 26, after minimal public debate, the Egyptian populace will vote on this package of amendments through referendum. Opposition groups are expected to boycott the vote.
Despite its longstanding rhetorical support for democratic reform, Washington’s response to date has been tepid at best. Statements issued by the U.S. State Department have not disparaged Mubarak’s democracy rollback. For democracy and civil society advocates throughout the Middle East, this is the latest evidence that the Bush administration has all but abandoned the policy of democracy promotion articulated by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Cairo in June 2005.
Background
On March 19, the 454-seat People’s Assembly — of which Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party bloc controls nearly two-thirds — passed the president’s amendment package by a vote of 315 in favor. (Muslim Brotherhood representatives boycotted the vote.) Slated to go to a national referendum just one week later, Mubarak’s amendment package has been roundly condemned by opposition activists and international human rights organizations. Both the content of the amendments and the process by which they were pushed toward referendum do not suggest a move toward greater political freedom.
Of the 34 articles intended for revision, amendments to Articles 179 and 88 prompt the most criticism. Billed as necessary counterterrorism measures, proposed amendments to Article 179 would grant the police broad powers to monitor private communications, violate home privacy, and bypass ordinary judicial channels by referring suspects to special military courts. This would essentially institutionalize the emergency law under which President Mubarak has operated since the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat, and limit freedom of expression indefinitely.
The amendment to Article 88 is even more significant as it would suspend judicial supervision of elections. Striking down the June 2000 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that requires the government to place each ballot box under the supervision of a judge, this amendment would remove the last significant check on election fraud — which Egyptian government officials privately acknowledge was rampant in the 2005 elections, even with judicial oversight in place. The Article 88 amendment must be seen in the context of the contentious and often violent disagreements between the ruling party and the Egyptian judges’ union over the past year and a half — as the other amendments continue the government’s increasingly brutal crackdown on political speech since the 2005 elections.
Still other amendments are specifically designed to ensure that the electoral successes of the Muslim Brotherhood in the December 2005 parliamentary elections are never repeated. One provision, for example, would ban the formation of legal political parties based on religion — in effect broadening and institutionalizing the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood that has forced its members to run as “independents.” Some secular reformers may be tempted to say that curbing the Brotherhood’s influence is a good thing — but not at the expense of the democratic process. Furthermore, under a proposed amendment, presidential candidates must hail from a recognized political party that maintains at least a 3 percent share of parliamentary seats, guaranteeing that “independents” will be barred from ever standing for the presidency.
In addition to the amendments themselves, the process by which they were pushed to referendum portends ill for the future of democratic discourse in the country. While the referendum was originally slated for April 4, the information ministry announced that the referendum would occur on March 26, giving voters only a week to digest the new amendments passed on March 19. While government spokespeople attributed the haste to Mubarak’s busy presidential calendar, which includes next week’s Arab League summit in Saudi Arabia , the quickly approaching referendum date gives the opposition a very small window to organize an effective campaign. Wary of legitimizing the referendum by participating, the leading opposition group (the Muslim Brotherhood) has already decided to boycott. Abdul Wahab al-Mesiri, the head of the secular Kefaya opposition movement, also announced his group’s intention of boycotting a vote that he characterized as tantamount to “a cancellation of the constitution.”
The U.S. Response
Washington’s official response to the Egyptian referendum has thus far been deeply disappointing to civil society advocates. On March 20, the State Department issued a press release acknowledging problems with certain policies, while at the same time inexplicably claiming that the overall trend in Egyptian politics is positive. “When you are able to at some point look back,” State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, “you will see a general trend towards greater political reform, greater political openness, [and] a more direct correlation between . . . the will and needs and hopes of the Egyptian people and those whom they elect.”
Human rights campaigners and civil society advocates disagree. Since the 2005 elections, organizations such as Human Rights Watch have catalogued numerous examples of Egyptian authorities restricting — often violently — the political speech of everyone from secular bloggers to the Muslim Brotherhood. During President Mubarak’s rule — which has now lasted longer than that of any Egyptian ruler since Muhammad Ali in the nineteenth century — there has been an undeniable move away from political reform toward autocracy. Amnesty International has described the proposed amendments as “the most serious undermining of human rights safeguards in Egypt since the state of emergency was re-imposed in 1981.”
The State Department response, however, even claims the Egyptian government is making progress toward judicial independence and that such independence is “a strength of the Egyptian system” — though amendment to Article 88 is explicitly designed to end such independence once and for all. For civil society advocates in Egypt, such pronouncements amount to U.S. complicity in the gradual erosion of democratic rights in their nation. Worse, for civil society advocates elsewhere in the region, Washington’s statements confirm that this administration has all but abandoned its democracy agenda in the Middle East — or has at least sacrificed it for other priorities in the region.
The United States is the only external power that can exert any meaningful pressure on Egypt, but, to do so, Washington must grasp the significance of these inherently antidemocratic amendments to the Egyptian constitution. Should the administration issue strong, forceful statements in opposition to such purported “reforms,” it will help the cause of civil society groups across the Middle East. On the other hand, should it continue to maintain this indifference toward a fundamental assault on key political rights, it runs the risk of inviting Congress to weigh in on the issue. Most opposition parties in Egypt are not, it must be said, friendly to U.S. interests in the region. But they — like the Egyptian government — closely follow the statements that come out of Washington. So too do democracy activists in the region, and it is for them as much as anyone that the United States ought not allow this encroachment on political freedom to go unchallenged.
Andrew Exum is the Soref Fellow at the Washington Institute. He lived in Egypt until August 2006, and is the author, most recently, of Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment. Zack Snyder is a research assistant at the Washington Institute.
IMAGINING OTHERWISE IN EGYPT
Opposition Campaign Embodying Bush Vision Now Lies in Pieces
By Anthony Shadid
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, March 18, 2007; Page A01
CAIRO — For two decades, politics in Cairo, the Arab world’s greatest capital, had emulated the leadership of President Hosni Mubarak: occasionally tedious and rarely inspired.
But seven years ago, as a sweltering summer began to break along the Nile, Cairo’s streets were jolted by the Palestinian uprising. Protests were organized, sometimes tolerated by the state. Activists collected aid for the Palestinians; peasant women, they recalled, were moved to donate gold bracelets, half-opened bags of rice, even squawking chickens. Then, on Sept. 10, 2001, at one of their demonstrations outside the downtown headquarters of Egyptian bureaucracy known as the Mugamma, a grim, Stalinist tribute to authority, a slogan was shouted. No one could recall ever hearing it at a protest.
“Down with Hosni Mubarak!” one activist, Wael Khalil, remembered someone yelling.
What followed was the emergence of the Arab world’s most ambitious democracy movement, coalescing in opposition to the taciturn Mubarak, now 78, a former air force commander who has ruled Egypt longer than any leader since Mohammed Ali, the 19th-century founder of the modern state. With its protests, banners and slogans, the largely secular, technically savvy movement represented what the Bush administration asserted was its vision of an effervescent Middle East, set to be transformed by U.S. strategy in Iraq and the world after the Sept. 11 attacks. Ironically, at almost every turn it was deep-seated opposition to American policies that rallied the protesters.
Today, that movement is in shambles. Its most committed supporters admit to a lack of vision, an inability to capture the imagination of the Egyptian people. Its leadership is riven by disputes over everything from the veil to charges of corruption. The government has crushed its momentum with impunity, deploying the ubiquitous security forces to arrest scores of activists, intimidate others and signal to the rest that it will no longer tolerate unsanctioned protest. Across the divide, the government’s supporters and foes are unanimous in their belief that U.S. pressure for change, occasionally effective in the past, has now decisively subsided.
“The sense of powerlessness is complete,” said Mohammed el-Sayed Said, a secular activist and writer who is trying to win permission to publish a new newspaper, the Alternative. “We’re back to the status quo we wanted to liberate the country from.”
The arc of Egypt’s democracy movement is a story of the unraveling of American policy and the contradictions that always shaped it. In the end, activists and officials say, the Bush administration chose realpolitik over promise, courting allies such as Egypt in a region beset by conflicts in the Palestinian territories and Lebanon, war in Iraq and the specter of an ascendant Iran. The movement’s ebb and flow is also a story of Egypt — the fate of ideas in the face of power, and of change confronting the accumulated force of decades of authoritarianism and stagnation in a nation once the Arab world’s unquestioned leader. In the autumn of Mubarak’s rule, a generation of activists inherited a country that, simply put, was no longer political.
It is a story that began with the slogan that the wiry, bearded Khalil heard in 2001.
Spurs to Action
“I loved it,” Aida Seif al-Dowla, a 51-year-old psychiatrist, said of the slogan as she sipped instant coffee in her cramped apartment near Cairo University.
“It was a bit annoying,” she recalled. “People were ready to be outspoken on Palestine and not as outspoken about Egypt. How can you express solidarity with people who are struggling and you’re not struggling yourself?”
From the heady days of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt’s Arab nationalist president, through Mubarak’s long reign, the country’s often feeble opposition politics have revolved around two axes: leftist currents that joined Marxists, socialists and communists, and a more powerful Islamic movement often repressed by the state. Al-Dowla hailed from the left. Her communist uncle was imprisoned under Nasser. As a high school student, she watched police storm her apartment in 1972 to arrest her father, a socialist lawyer.
An activist life followed, focused on promoting women’s issues, trying to ensure primary health care for the poor and, most prominently, assisting torture victims. “Their stories were endless,” she said, a note of awe in her voice. “Endless.”
Then came the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, in September 2000, its images filtering across a landscape transformed by technology and energizing older activists such as al-Dowla. Al-Jazeera, the pan-Arab satellite television network, broadcast searing footage. A boycott of U.S. and Israeli goods was spread by the most modern of means: e-mail, the Internet and cellphones. The campaign gave rise to a student movement such as Cairo had not witnessed since the turbulent 1970s. What many saw as American aggressiveness in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks propelled it forward.
“We grew up under Nasser, so Palestine was part of our psyche, if you want,” al-Dowla said. “But there was this new generation, our kids who did not live this. This was the amazing thing, the new generation.”
“Those were the first protests we went to,” said Alaa Seif, a stocky, bespectacled 25-year-old who did poorly in school but has a knack for computers, a testiness toward authority of any kind and the cockiness that comes with youth.
It wasn’t until the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, that Seif and his wife, Manal Hassan, felt inspired. Crowds indignant at the attack and Egypt’s alliance with the United States, including the passage of U.S. warships through the Suez Canal, surged into Cairo’s Liberation Square, converged on the ruling party’s headquarters and tried to move on the U.S. Embassy, where they were blocked by phalanxes of helmeted Central Security Forces conscripts. Seif remembered someone tearing down a banner for Mubarak. Khalil, the veteran activist, recalled the president’s portrait being set on fire. As the hours passed, anti-U.S. chants melded into a chorus of protests against Mubarak’s government.
“I felt if we could keep that spirit for a while, we could challenge the government,” Khalil said. “The conclusions were unanimous in a sense: Let’s talk about Egypt. Let’s talk about dictatorship. Let’s talk about Mubarak. They’re part of the same story.”
Birth of a Movement
For 11 years, Abul-Ela Maadi has tried to win government approval for Egypt’s first Islamic, albeit moderate, political party. His shelves are cluttered with binders, packed with thousands of articles and interviews by him and his followers attempting to prove that his brand of politics has a place in the mainstream.
Fond of Pierre Cardin suits and quick to smile, Maadi is a garrulous man whose friends defy categorization: Coptic Christians, devout Muslims, leftists and followers of both Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood. For years, he invited them and others to his home, a first-floor apartment with a view of the Pyramids, to share iftar, the traditional meal that breaks the daily Ramadan fast. In November 2003, 22 people from across the spectrum attended, Marxists mingling with Islamic activists. After a sumptuous meal of stuffed pigeon and a soupy dish known as mulukhiya, they sat for hours over tea, addressing the question Maadi put forward.
“What can we do?” he asked.
In the months that followed, a journalist, Abdel-Halim Qandil, and others joined the group. They came up with a name, the Egyptian Movement for Change. But the question lingered, even as protests gathered force. In time, variants of it would prove most vexing for the emerging circle of activists: What could they do to transform the talk of a salon into a politics of the street? What role would the United States play? And how would the nascent group confront a state that, in times of crisis and perceived threat, proved itself all too willing to deploy the unassailable power of its security forces?
A Brusque Warning
As early as the 1990s, Egypt’s smattering of opposition newspapers had begun challenging the government. But by 2004, even as Maadi’s group formed and mounting protests voiced unprecedented criticism of a figure some simply call “the big man,” attacks on Mubarak were still a red line the news media had not crossed. That made the columns of Qandil, a fast-talking, ascetic-looking editor with glasses, even more striking. There was little metaphor in his writings, the usual tool of critical Arab media. Instead, in the months after the question posed at the Ramadan meeting, Qandil bluntly put to his readers the suspicions on everyone’s mind: Would Mubarak do away with any pretense that he presided over a republic and pass power to his son Gamal?
In el-Arabi, a leftist opposition newspaper, Qandil suggested that father and son represented “a dual presidency.”
Mubarak’s powers are “God-like,” he wrote, critically.
Less than a month later — on Tuesday, Nov. 2, 2004 — a colleague dropped Qandil off at 3 a.m. near his home on the bustling road to the Pyramids. It was Ramadan again, the Muslim month of fasting when Cairo seems to stay up round-the-clock. A few minutes later, a car with four men barreled toward him and stopped. The men jumped out, blindfolded him and stuffed him in the back seat. The car then careened into Cairo’s warrens, passing checkpoints unhindered.
“I thought I was a dead man,” Qandil recalled.
During the hour-long ride, he remembered being given a clear message: “No more words about the big people,” he was told. Next time he would be killed. A few minutes later, one of the men answered his cellphone. “Yes, sir,” Qandil recalled him barking, as if answering an order.
The car stopped on the outskirts of the city, on the road toward Suez. Qandil said the men stripped and beat him, stole his cellphone and the equivalent of about $100, then left him lying in the desert at the side of the road. He eventually caught a ride back and later filed a complaint against the Interior Ministry, which denied any role. “It will stay forever in the court,” he said glumly.
In his sparse downtown office, at the top of stone stairs, each step worn into an arched bow, the editor became angry as he recalled the incident many now see as a turning point for those frustrated by increasingly brutish repression. The government is, of course, not a democracy, he said; that implies freedom. But it’s not a dictatorship, either, he added; that requires strength. “It’s more like the rubble, the debris left behind,” he said, his voice tinged with disgust.
‘Enough, We’ve Had It!’
The past, sometimes imagined, haunts Cairo. From taxis outside Qandil’s office, the songs of the late Abdel-Halim Hafez, with their woeful violin, drift along streets buckling under their own chaos. They mingle sometimes with the melodies of Um Kalthoum, a name usually uttered with nostalgia for the bygone era when Egypt reigned almost unchallenged in the Arab world. “Give me my freedom, set free my hands!” she sings in one popular song.
“This regime hasn’t achieved anything in the last two or three decades, total stagnation in every aspect of life. You only need to walk a few minutes in the street,” said Osama Ghazali al-Harb, an academic and editor who eventually resigned from the ruling National Democratic Party in protest. Frustration mounted in his voice. “Everything has deteriorated. Everything! Everything!”
In 2004, the anger of Harb, Qandil and others gave rise to a simple word: kifaya, enough. It was heard in taxis, drivers turning their engines off in the snarled and neglected streets. It was pronounced by activists enraged over the treatment of Qandil. It was whispered at the prospect of an unprecedented fifth term for Mubarak, who had once said he expected only to become head of Egypt Air or ambassador to Britain. And it was shouted at a protest that year that drew Seif, the young activist who began blogging about the demonstration, and al-Dowla, who recalled the word.
“It picked up like this,” al-Dowla said, snapping her fingers. “Enough, we’re fed up!” she said. “Enough, we’ve had it! Enough, leave us!”
The group formed during Maadi’s Ramadan iftar soon became known as Kifaya. It issued its first declaration, a manifesto critical of the United States and Israel, as well as “the repressive despotism that pervades all aspects of the Egyptian political system.” And on Dec. 12, 2004, the group held its first protest.
The demonstration was the first to be aimed solely at Mubarak. More than 500 men and women stood silently in front of the Supreme Court, many with yellow stickers over their mouths or on their chests. “Enough,” the stickers declared in red.
“It was like I was dreaming,” recalled George Ishaq, 68, a Christian high school principal who got his start as an activist during the 1956 Arab-Israeli war and soon became the group’s leader. “It was the first time Egyptian people could listen to another vision.”
Ishaq shared the almost delirious optimism of others at that moment, the sense that the inviolable red line underpinning the government’s prestige had been erased. Lacking popular support and the legitimacy of past ideologies such as Arab or Egyptian nationalism, the government now depended for its survival, the activists believed, on the president’s Pharaonic stature. As that fell apart, so would the state.
Qandil thought the government might begin to crumble if 100 people poured into the streets; others suggested it would take 1,000. Ishaq was similarly convinced of the state’s frailty. “Give me the TV for 24 hours, and I will change Egypt completely,” he said then. “The door of change is open, and no one can close it again. Never.”
The Movement Flowers
The months that followed in 2005 represented a flowering of Egyptian dissidence unlike any in a generation. The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s oldest Islamic movement and, by far, the largest if also quiescent opposition group, began organizing protests; in a rare move, the Brotherhood and the largely secular Kifaya began reaching out to each other, shattering a long-held taboo.
Ayman Nour, an opposition party leader who had been arrested in January, was released from prison in March (only to be convicted and, ailing, imprisoned again in December 2005). Egyptian judges pushed for judicial oversight of Egypt’s notoriously rigged elections. Every few weeks, a new group seemed to emerge: Youth for Change, Lawyers for Change, Writers and Artists for Change and, at one point, Peasants for Change, all of them seizing ground from Egypt’s coterie of ossified, co-opted and long ago legalized opposition parties. Banners cluttered the colonnaded marble facade of the Press Syndicate building. “No political reform without freedom of the press,” one declared.
At demonstrations, some invoked Sheik Imam, a blind, beloved protest singer who died in 1995: “They live in the latest-style home, while we live 10 in a room!” Others spoke more dramatically: “My country, you need a revolution.”
But even in those animated months of 2005, as U.S. officials pressured the Egyptian government to reform, activists began to worry. Why weren’t the protests — the 100 people Qandil hoped for — drawing bigger crowds?
Some admitted that a paradox had begun to emerge in a country seemingly depoliticized by decades of slumbering civic life: The more freedom activists had, the more their lack of popular support was exposed.
The Brotherhood, with a far greater ability to bring out numbers, was almost condescending, even as it tentatively took part. “People think about their livelihood before they think about freedom,” said Ali Abdel Fattah, a Brotherhood leader. “If there was hope protests would bring something, they would have been protesting a long time ago.” Even Ishaq, the Kifaya leader, acknowledged the challenge. “Our people are naive,” he said.
Said, the secular activist and writer, was more direct. “A crisis is looming,” he said at the time. “We communicated the message, we expressed the mood, but that’s far from saying people support Kifaya and engage in the struggle in any real numbers.”
COMMENTARY: MOROCCO’S ISLAMIC QUESTION
Martin Walker
UPI – April 3, 2007
http://www.metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20070403-043605-3811r
RABAT— An important election will take place in September when Morocco – one of the Islamic world’s most liberal and progressive countries – goes to the polls to cast a verdict on the ambitious modernization program of the new King Mohammed VI.
The big question is whether the largest single party to emerge in the new parliament will be the Islamist PJD (Party of Justice and Development). US diplomats, who routinely talk with PJD leaders, note that the party opposes violence and follows the moderate Islamism of the current Turkish government.
But the George W. Bush administration visibly cooled its rhetorical support for democratic change in the Arab world when recent elections in Egypt and the Palestinian territories suggested Islamists are likely to be the main beneficiaries.
There is no disputing the trend in Morocco. In 1997 the PJD won just nine seats, but that jumped to 34 in the 2002 elections, and even government officials think they will win at least 60 seats in September. And as the largest party, the king may be persuaded to appoint one of its leaders as prime minister.
The decision will rest with the king, who retains sweeping powers and keeps firm control of the interior, defense, and foreign affairs ministries. Other parties might form a coalition that keeps the Islamists out, but that may only delay the Islamist purge. Their popularity is growing because they represent the main opposition to the current coalition government in which socialists serve alongside conservatives.
Morocco is taking a cautious and controlled route to democracy, and it represents the kind of Islam that the Bush administration and, in its own way, the European Union, admire; both would like to see it become a model for others. For the United States, Morocco enjoys the status of a non-North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally and has deployed peacekeeping troops to the Balkans in support of NATO and EU missions.
NATO’s former deputy commander, German Gen. Dieter Stockman, said of Moroccans that “they were excellent troops, disciplined and intelligent and a pleasure to work with.”
Meanwhile, Morocco last week published the impressive results of the first year of its new free trade agreement with the United States. Trade rose by a striking 44 percent to $1.4 billion. Morocco’s exports of textiles rose by 81 percent, and its exports of electrical machinery rose to $122 million. In return, Morocco imported US aircraft worth $250 million and $163-million worth of American cereals.
Morocco‘s biggest trade partner is still the EU, but with its free trade zones and open door for foreign investment, Morocco is a country increasingly plugged into the global economy. It ranks no. 36, ahead of Turkey and Israel, in the line up of the best places for offshoring, according to the latest Global Services Location index published by the A.T. Kearney consultancy. The same group also publishes the globalization index, in which Morocco and Tunisia are the only two Arab countries in the Top 40, notably ahead of China at no. 51.
With a per capita Gross Domestic Product nudging $2,000, the economy grew more than 6 percent last year and is poised for take off, helped by the $4.5 billion in remittances sent home by Moroccans working abroad.
The country now has almost all its children in primary school, more than half of them in secondary school, and the life expectancy is now greater than 70. The birth rate has dropped to an average of 2.5 children per woman of child-bearing age, and infant mortality rates have dropped from 115 to 38 per thousand. This is a country doing everything it can to do everything right, despite a decade of grim droughts in the 1990s, persistently high unemployment, and grinding poverty in the rural and mountain areas.
The modernization has been driven by the young king and a small, tight-knit group of technocratic ministers, many of them the king’s university classmates. In three days of intensive talks with various ministers and the monarch’s top aides, this reporter was left in no doubt of their determination to follow the “Asian tiger” economies and steer Morocco into the EU’s prosperity club.
“We are like a tree, with roots in Africa and the Arab world, but we breathe the air and take our rain from Europe,” ambassador Hassan Abouyoub, the king’s top foreign policy adviser said. “We cannot live without Europe; we have no choice.”
The monarch, who likes to be called “guardian of the poor” because of his fight against rural poverty, has pushed through the Moudawana, a crucial reform for the rights of women, despite the opposition of religious conservatives. Married to a computer engineer with whom he has two children, the king is a devout Muslim, and even the most extreme Islamists find it difficult to challenge the religious credentials of a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. Over the weekend, religious leaders from all over the country flew into the fabled desert city of Marrakech, where the king presided over a celebration of the birthday of his revered ancestor.
There is no question that Morocco is an Islamic country, and of a traditionally tolerant and relaxed form in which the country’s important Jewish heritage is celebrated, alcohol is freely available (and the local wines are good), and Christians and Jews can meet and worship at will. But there are ugly signs of extremism. Bomb attacks in Casablanca in 2003 led to tough new anti-terrorism laws that have been criticized by human-rights groups.
Morocco expects that its elections will generate intense interest and wide media coverage that is more likely to focus on the Islamist rise rather than on the story of reform, rising prosperity, and democratization that the king and his aides would prefer to tell. But, even if the Islamists do better than expected at the polls, their broadly moderate stance might yet demonstrate, much as Turkey and Malaysia have done, that democracy and Islam can work fruitfully together.
PAKISTANI POLITICAL STRIFE PROMPTS ACTION AMONG EMIGRES
By Pamela Constable
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, April 7, 2007; B01
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/06/AR2007040601826_pf.html
Asif Shah, a lawyer in the District, watched in mute dismay for years as his homeland was branded a hotbed of Islamic terrorism. Like other members of the Washington area’s Pakistani American community, he winced every time someone suggested that Osama bin Laden was hiding in Pakistan but tried to pretend it had nothing to do with him.
Then last month, something snapped in the slight, scholarly man of 57. On TV, he watched demonstrations erupt after military authorities suspended Pakistan’s top civilian judge and police attacked a private TV station. He saw lawyers and politicians choking on tear gas and braving police batons.
Unable to remain silent, Shah and a Pakistani friend composed a protest petition and circulated it among their colleagues in the D.C. Bar Association, 106 of whom signed it. The two made photocopies and mailed them to senior U.S. and Pakistani officials.
“We wanted to play a part, however small, in the struggle to bring the rule of law to our country,” said Shah, who represents abused children and troubled teenagers in D.C. Superior Court. “I have seen how the law really works in America, how no one here is above justice. Why should that not happen in my country, too?”
Even as a symbolic gesture, Shah’s petition — which asks Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to resign as army chief and hold free elections — was unusual for a thriving regional immigrant group of about 50,000 that has generally tried to distance itself from Pakistan’s travails and focus on getting ahead here.
Pakistani American leaders said they have long struggled to overcome negative stereotypes that persisted even as many of them became successful in business, formed professional associations and began raising funds for U.S. political candidates, including Bill Clinton and, more recently, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
Those stereotypes intensified, they said, after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Even though Musharraf quickly established himself as an ally in the Western fight against terrorism, Pakistan remained a high-profile source of Islamic violence, including the gruesome execution of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in 2002.
“When Americans think of Pakistan, they tend to think of men with beards and women with their faces covered, and people who think Osama is a hero,” said Irfan Malik, a Howard County businessman who heads the National Association of Pakistani-Americans. “A large percentage of Pakistanis are moderates, who feel their country has done a lot for the U.S. but has not been appreciated. They are looking at two different pictures.”
Amina Khan, a lawyer in Northwest Washington, said she felt she had more in common with American-born professional women than with traditional Pakistani village women. She said that she tried to be a “personal ambassador” between Pakistani immigrants and American society but that she often felt put on the defensive.
“People want to put you in a box,” said Khan, 37. “It can be very awkward. You have to dissociate yourself from extremist groups you would never associate with. It would be like being an American from the South and having to prove you are not a racist.”
Until recently, Musharraf was viewed as an asset to Pakistan’s image abroad. His government has arrested several hundred suspected al-Qaeda figures, and the charismatic general was often described as an honest reformer and a moderate Muslim opposed to Islamic fundamentalism.
“People in this region know Musharraf is our ally in the war on terror. They don’t perceive it as supporting a dictator to stay in power,” Khan said.
Pakistan‘s fortunes as a target for Western investment have also risen in recent years, earning the country a toehold in the mammoth business outsourcing industry that has long been dominated by India, Pakistan’s neighbor and rival.
Asad Naqvi, a polished young entrepreneur whose office is one block from the White House, seems to epitomize a Westernized, can-do generation of Pakistani Americans who hope to build successful careers here as they help to build Pakistan’s economy — while steering clear of its politics.
Naqvi’s employer, the Resource Group, specializes in promoting Pakistan as a location for international call centers. Its main selling point is a large pool of workers who are educated, willing to earn less and trained to speak with soft, neutral accents.
“We are out there pitching Pakistan as an offshore service delivery destination. The key is to talk about Pakistan in a way that is not related to its politics, not to be hostage to every political hiccup,” said Naqvi, 28, a graduate of Georgetown University. “For us, it’s business as usual.”
In recent months, Musharraf’s honeymoon with the West has soured. The main reason is the revival of the Taliban Islamic militia in neighboring Afghanistan, a revival Afghan leaders blame on support from Pakistan. U.S. officials, after years of praising Pakistan for its cooperation against terrorism, have begun criticizing it for failing to control Islamic extremists at home.
At the same time, the Musharraf government has drawn increasing criticism for its political behavior, including attempts to control national elections scheduled for October. In the past month alone, the chief justice of the supreme court was suspended, a TV station was shut down by police, and hundreds of unarmed demonstrators were arrested.
Pakistani diplomats here adamantly defended the country’s efforts to control Islamic extremism by a combination of military assaults and peace negotiations. As for the political crackdown, they said that mistakes had been made but that Musharraf was still committed to political freedoms.
“I agree there is an image problem, but there has also been a misreading of the situation,” said Mahmud Ali Durrani, Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington. “Musharraf may have faults, but he is totally secular. He may be in uniform, but he is not a dictator. We are not perfect, but we have been good allies, and we deserve a little credit.”
As street demonstrations by lawyers and politicians continued in Pakistan this month, however, some Pakistani Americans have begun to wonder whether the regime is beginning to unravel. The possibility, they said, has brought fears of violent instability and hopes for a democratic breakthrough.
“Pakistan is poor, but it still deserves to have democratic institutions,” Shah said. “In America, we can speak without fears of having our offices ransacked or someone knocking on our door in the night. We don’t know if our petition will make any difference, but it seems like the least we can do.”
HEAR OUT THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
By Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata
The Boston Globe | March 25, 2007
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles
/2007/03/25/hear_out_muslim_brotherhood/?p1=email_to_a_friend
ON A QUIET, one-way street in Cairo’s middle-class Manial district, two bored security guards sit idly sipping tea. The building behind them houses a small apartment that serves as the main offices of the Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest Islamist group in the Middle East. In Egypt, the Brotherhood is the country’s largest opposition group and its best-organized political force. No one would know it from the headquarters’ modest appearance, but the Brotherhood is likely to be the dominant force in Egyptian politics in the future. Yet the United States stubbornly refuses to deal with the Brotherhood, taking its cue from the sclerotic and hopelessly corrupt regime of Hosni Mubarak.
According to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the United States does not deal with the group because it is illegal under Egyptian law. But basing policy on an authoritarian government’s legal manipulations is not in America’s interests. If American policy is to be effective or credible in Egypt and the wider region, the United States should engage with Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, the most popular and organized political movement in Egypt. Rice is scheduled to be in Egypt this weekend to meet with Mubarak, so now is an ideal time for talks with the Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood is a mainstream non violent organization that has operated responsibly and predictably within Egypt for decades. Founded in 1928, it has survived British colonialism, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab nationalism and intense repression, and Anwar Sadat’s rapprochement with the West. It is likely to outlive the Mubarak regime and its ruling National Democratic Party. In Egypt’s partially open 2005 legislative elections, the Brotherhood won 20 percent of the assembly’s seats, making it the largest opposition bloc in parliament. So it makes sense for US officials to sit across the table from Brotherhood representatives, just as the the United States does with other political forces and opposition parties in the country.
Islamist political groups are incredibly popular in the Middle East, and will remain so for some time. As the oldest of these groups, the Brotherhood has continuing ties to other regional Islamist parties and movements. The United States currently lacks access to some of these Islamist organizations. Engaging with the Brotherhood, therefore, would open up new channels of communication with Islamist groups. It would also signal that the United States is open to talking with all groups that are committed to peaceful political participation.
The Brotherhood has consistently demonstrated a long-term commitment to working peacefully within Egypt’s legal framework — despite years of repression against the group’s members. The organization has offices across the country, and its members regularly compete in all types of elections. Unlike other Islamist organizations, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Brotherhood has no armed wing, and neither the US Department of State nor the European Union considers it a terrorist group.
Indeed, despite its illegality under Egyptian law, the regime tolerates many of its activities, including a wide network of social welfare services, religious activities, and professional and civic organizations.
Opening a relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood would signal to ruling regimes and opposition groups in the region that the United States is committed to promoting democracy — not just to supporting those who are friendly to US interests. Democracy requires a broader commitment to political participation, inclusion, reform, moderation, transparency, accountability, and better governance.
Furthering contacts with the Brotherhood would not constitute a drastic departure for American foreign policy. Despite the lack of a relationship now, American officials have had occasional contact with the Brotherhood in the past. American government officials last held talks with the organization in late 2001, under the current Bush presidency. Although the Egyptian government has occasionally expressed displeasure at such meetings, the American-Egyptian relationship has not suffered as a consequence.
Egypt receives billions of dollars a year in aid from the United States, and Washington has a responsibility to meet with all of Egypt’s relevant political organizations. After the Brotherhood’s success in the 2005 parliamentary elections and the increasing popularity of other Islamist groups in the region, the United States needs to consider an open and frank dialogue with moderate, nonviolent Islamist groups. And there is no more important moderate Islamist group in the region than Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood.
Joshua Stacher is an adjunct history lecturer at the American University in Cairo. Samer Shehata is assistant professor at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University.
US DEMOCRAT IN BROTHERHOOD MEETING
SUNDAY, APRIL 08, 2007
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B11A07C6-46AB-4B8E-A975-355C2F846C42.htm
A senior US Democrat has met a leading member of Egypt’s banned Muslim Brotherhood, despite past refusals by US officials to meet with Brotherhood leaders.
Steny Hoyer, the US House majority leader, met Mohammed Saad el-Katatni, the Brotherhood’s parliamentary leader, twice on Thursday, according to Hamdi Hassan, a Brotherhood spokesman.
Hassan said the two met at the parliament building and again later at the home of Francis Ricciardone, the US ambassador to Egypt.
But John Berry, a US spokesman, only confirmed that the two met on Thursday at the US ambassador’s home as part of a reception that included other parliament members.
Berry said the talks between el-Katatni and Hoyer were not a change in US policy towards the group.
“It’s our diplomatic practice around the world to meet with parliamentarians, be they members of political parties or independents,” Berry said.
“We haven’t changed our policy with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation.”
Berry said that Hoyer met with el-Katatni in his capacity as an independent member of the Egyptian parliament, but would not say what the two discussed.
Hassan, though, said the two discussed developments in the Middle East, the “Brotherhood’s vision” and opposition movements in Egypt.
The meeting comes just a day after Nancy Pelosi, a US Democrat and speaker of the House of Representatives, met Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, in Damascus, despite criticism from the US administration.
Pelosi and other Democrats argue the US needs to engage Syria to resolve some of the problems in the Middle East, an approach the current US administration, under George Bush, the president, rejects.
Bush has accused Syria of exacerbating the situation in Iraq and Lebanon.
Banned outfit
The Muslim Brotherhood has been banned in Egypt since 1954.
Despite the ban, the Brotherhood renounced violence in the 1970s and focused its energy on social welfare programmes.
In 2005 many of its members ran for election as independent political candidates, winning one-fifth of the 454 seats in parliament, to become the largest opposition bloc.
As the Brotherhood’s popularity has improved, the Egyptian government’s tolerance of the group has decreased.
The Egyptian authorities have jailed about 300 members of the Brotherhood, including 40 leading figures who are set to stand trial in military courts.
The government has also ordered a freeze on the assets of 29 Brotherhood members, accusing them of financing a banned movement.
‘US double-standard’
The US has put pressure on Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian president, regarding other opposition figures such as Ayman Nour, a secular politician who was jailed after challenging Mubarak in the 2005 presidential elections, but Washington has not spoken out over similar campaigns against the Brotherhood.
“The Americans have been under criticism that they speak out only when secularists are cracked down on but don’t say a word when Islamists are under harsh crackdowns,” said Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a secular pro-democracy Egyptian-American activist in Cairo.
Jon Alterman, a Middle East specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said the Brotherhood’s legal status in Egypt meant US officials avoided meeting its leaders, in order not to strain relations with the Egyptian government, one of the closest US allies in the Middle East.
“The difficulty when it gets to Egypt is that the Brotherhood is not a legal group within Egypt and the US government is wary of violating laws in countries in which it operates,” he said.
ISLAMIST DIVERSITY IS AL- QAEDA’S ENEMY
Abdel Monem Said Aly
www.bitterlemons-international.org
Almost six years after the great terrorist attack of 9/11, al-Qaeda remains an active terrorist organization. With its Taliban allies, it dominates regions along the Afghan- Pakistani border. It is making the life of NATO forces and the Afghan government very difficult in the rest of Afghanistan, and has compelled American forces in Iraq to contemplate leaving the country. From time to time, the worldwide organization is capable of launching strikes in western and Islamic capitals alike. Perhaps most important, copy-cat organizations with allegiance to al- Qaeda are spreading in Arab and Islamic countries. Al-Qaeda has become a model for Muslim youth to emulate and follow. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, are spreading the word of terror and militancy regularly through the internet and al-Jazeera TV station.
Still, the future of al-Qaeda is uncertain. The world is now capable of fighting the deadly organization better than at any time before. The frequency of its operations in any one country has been reduced. It has not been for lack of effort that al-Qaeda has failed to repeat its attack on the US but rather because of methodical American security work. Worldwide security cooperation has proven fruitful. This struggle between measures taken by security services and al- Qaeda’s ability to reinvent itself in different countries will most likely continue for some time to come.
Al-Qaeda’s future will also be linked to the rest of the Islamic fundamentalist phenomenon all over the world. Islamic fundamentalism is diversified. In a typical Muslim country or community, it expresses itself in diverse ways.
One such way is a sharp increase in the religiosity of the population. The religious establishment (al-Azhar in Egypt, parallel institutions in other Muslim countries) moves from dependency on the government to adoption of more conservative views. The Muslim Brotherhood becomes the Islamic fundamentalist mainstream. The brothers’ view of religion is comprehensive, encompassing life and death, religion and state, the individual and the community. They do not accept terror and violence as a mode of political behavior except when Muslims are subject to aggression by others. They believe in a democratic political process in which the basic tenets of Islam are observed. Their democratic understanding is basically majoritarian. In general they use religious symbols to incite and mobilize the population and energize voters.
Populist Islam, in turn, is represented by individuals who use modern media, particularly television, to influence large numbers of audiences in Islamic countries. They vary from the most moderate to extremists. The vast majority are conservatives who use diverse methods to mobilize Muslim masses.
Radical Islam is represented by a large number of organizations that operate mostly underground and espouse diverse forms of political violence. The most notable are the Gamaat Islamiya and Jihad Islami groups. These terrorists espouse violence in Islamic, Arab, and western countries in order to change the world so that it more closely resembles a virtuous society. The best examples of these are the Taliban and al-Qaeda; although they are the most threatening, most other groups in this category also adhere to the central idea of separation from a western-dominated world. They have negative assessments regarding both the extent to which international relations are just and the moral codes that govern their interactions.
However, the diversity of these groups also reflects different interests and understandings of the world. Ironically, this diversity might contribute to the decline of al-Qaeda and its associates because of their global tendencies, in contrast with the nationalist features of the other groups. Zawahiri’s criticism of Hamas in Palestine, Hizballah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for being soft and consorting with the enemy in parliaments has caused al-Qaeda to lose many of its admirers in the Arab world. The militancy displayed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his colleagues in Iraq against Shi’ites was rejected by other fundamentalists as divisive to the Islamic world and as interfering with the construction of a worldwide front against western hegemony.
Yet in the long term, the future of al-Qaeda is linked even more to the overall political and economic development of the Arab and Islamic world, the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict and the development of a globalized liberal wing within the ranks of Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamic liberals believe in the congruence between Islam and democracy; the concept of citizenship is central to their moral commitment. They are represented in the Justice and Development party in Morocco, the Wasat party in Egypt and the Justice and Reconciliation party in Turkey. Unfortunately, such groups are not abundant at present, but future developments might make them the majority.- Published 29/3/2007 bitterlemons- international.org
Abdel Monem Said Aly is the director of Al Ahram Center for Political & Strategic Studies in Cairo.
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM BRITAIN ABOUT IRAN
By Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh
Published: April 5, 2007
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/opinion/05NasrTakeyh.html?pagewanted=2
THROUGH the capture of and subsequent announcement that it would release 15 British sailors and marines, the Islamic Republic of Iran sent its adversaries a pointed message: just as Iran will meet confrontation with confrontation, it will respond to what it perceives as flexibility with pragmatism. This message is worth heeding as the United States and Iran seem to be moving inexorably toward conflict.
The timing of the Britons capture was no accident. The incident followed the passage of a United Nations resolution censuring Iran for its nuclear infractions, the dispatch of American aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf and the American sanctioning of Iranian banks. Although the Bush administration has been busy proclaiming its increasingly confrontational Iran policy a success, Tehrans unsubtle conduct in the Persian Gulf suggests otherwise.
Had the British followed the American example, once the sailors and marines were seized, they could have escalated the conflict by pursuing the matter more forcefully at the United Nations or sending additional naval vessels to the area. Instead, the British tempered their rhetoric and insisted that diplomacy was the only means of resolving the conflict. The Iranians received this as pragmatism on Londons part and responded in kind.
The United States, meanwhile, has pursued its policy of coercion for two months now, and one is hard-pressed to find evidence of success. Beyond even the symbolic move of apprehending the British sailors, Irans intransigent position on the nuclear issue remains unchanged. To underscore that point, Iran has scaled back cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and released a new currency note adorned with a nuclear emblem.
Moreover, although Iran has proved willing to talk to Saudi Arabia, especially regarding Lebanon, it has yielded no new ground. In fact, Saudi Arabias concerns, relayed to Irans chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, during his visit to Riyadh in January, went unanswered. And if the March 10 meeting of neighbors in Baghdad was supposed to bring a chastened Iran to the table, the opposite happened. Far from being accommodating, Iran boldly asked for a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq. But the meeting was noteworthy in making a show of Irans regional influence and its importance to the future of Iraq.
The United States faces a stark choice: it will have to either escalate its confrontational policy or adopt a policy of engagement. Far from arresting the Iranian danger, escalation would most likely present the United States with new perils. Given the balance of power in the region, a continued confrontational course with Iran would saddle the United States with a commitment to staying in the Persian Gulf indefinitely and deploying to other conflict areas in an environment of growing radicalism. It would place the United States at the heart of the regions conflicts, leaving it all the more vulnerable to ideological extremism and terrorism at home and abroad.
Beyond such concerns, a continued policy of confrontation will also complicate Americas Iraq policy. Just as Iraqi Sunnis have cultural and political ties with Sunni Arab states and look to them for support, Iraqi Shiites trust and depend on Iran. An Iraq policy that allies the United States with Sunni Arab governments to eliminate Iranian influence in Iraq will be construed as biased against the Shiites. Such a policy will not win the support of the Shiite-dominated government on which the success of the new American strategy depends.
Since the United States entered Iraq in 2003, Washington has complained about Irans meddling, and about its involvement with radical groups and militias. Still, Iran, far more than any of the Sunni Arab regimes, has also supported the Shiite-dominated government and the Iraqi political process that brought it to power. If Iraq were to exclude Iran and seek to diminish its regional influence, Iran would have no further vested interest in the Iraqi political process, and it could play a far more destabilizing role. Therefore, the current policy will not reduce the Iranian threat to Iraq but rather increase it.
An American conflict with Iran would also undermine regional stability, jeopardize the economic gains of the Persian Gulf emirates and inflame Muslim public opinion. Persistent clashes with the United States will radicalize the Iranian theocracy and, more important, the Iranian public.
Iran today sees regional stability in its interest. It abandoned the goal of exporting its revolution to its Persian Gulf neighbors at the end of 1980s and has since acted as a status-quo power. It seeks influence within the existing regional power structure. It improved its relations with its Persian Gulf neighbors throughout the 1990s, and in particular normalized relations with Saudi Arabia. Iran supported the stabilization of Afghanistan in 2001 and that of Iraq during the early phase of the occupation. Conflict will change the direction that Iranian foreign policy has been following, and this will be a change for the worse and for the more confrontational.
A judicious engagement policy will require patience and must begin with a fundamental shift in the style and content of American diplomacy. The breakthrough in American-Chinese relations during the Nixon administration followed such a course. Beijing responded favorably to engagement only after two years of unilateral American gestures. As part of a similar effort toward Iran, the Unites States should try to create a more suitable environment for diplomacy by taking actions that gradually breach the walls of mistrust.
Washington can begin by ending its provocative naval deployments in the Persian Gulf, easing its efforts to get European and Asian banks to divest from Iran and inviting Iranian representatives to all regional and international conferences dealing with the Middle East. Along this path, the language of American diplomacy would also have to alter. The administration cannot propose negotiations while castigating Iran as part of an axis of evil or the central banker of terrorism and forming a regional alliance to roll back Iranian influence.
Once a more suitable environment has been created, the United States should propose dialogue without conditions with the aim of normalizing relations. For too long, proposed talks with Iran have focused on areas of American concern: nuclear proliferation and Iraq. A more comprehensive platform would involve the totality of disagreements between the two countries and also address Irans regional interests.
On the nuclear issue, Iran would have to accede to a rigorous inspection regime to make certain that its nuclear material would not be diverted for military purposes. In the meantime, more cooperative relations between the two parties could benefit stability in Iraq, where both Tehran and Washington support the same Shiite-led government.
After 28 years of sanctions and containment, it is time to accept that pressure has not tempered Irans behavior. The announced release of the British captives shows that the Islamic Republic is still willing to mitigate its ideology with pragmatism. A policy of patient engagement will change the context, and that may lead Iran to see relations with America to be in its own interest. Only then will Tehran chart a new course at home and abroad.
Vali Nasr is a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and the author of The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic.
GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: IS THE AL-SADRITE MOVEMENT IMPLODING?
April 06, 2007
A senior aide to radical Iraqi Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr revealed on Thursday that al-Sadr had sacked two senior lawmakers representing his al-Sadrite Bloc in parliament after they met with Gen. David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq. The two deputies, Salam al-Maliki and Qusai Abdul-Wahab, reportedly attended a dinner gathering at the home of former Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari also attended by Petraeus — though in an interview with U.S.-funded Alhurra television, al-Maliki denied meeting Petraeus or any U.S. official.
The firings only add to the growing crisis within the ruling Shiite Islamist coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance, which has recently seen the departure of its fourth-largest component party, Fadhila. But beyond the matter of Shiite unity, the move highlights what appears to be the gradual implosion of the al-Sadrite movement.
Until now, the problems appeared to be confined to the armed wing of the al-Sadrite Bloc — the Mehdi Army — where there has been talk of rogue elements and commanders who are conducting independent operations. Then there is the matter of the joint U.S.-Iraqi security plan, which is designed to crack down on al-Sadr’s militia, and has increased pressure on al-Sadr to the point that he has been forced to go into hiding. We are told by sources close to the al-Sadr family that he is in Iran.
Al-Sadr’s absence from the scene is only exacerbating his growing apprehension about the loyalties (or lack thereof) of his own people. Losing control over fighters and militia commanders is bad, but losing control over parliamentary deputies could prove to be even worse. This issue is even more critical for al-Sadr, given his own position as the head of the radical Shiite Islamist movement in Iraq.
Al-Sadr is neither a cleric nor a politician. He not only lacks clerical credentials, never having completed his seminary studies, but also does not hold public office. What this means is that he cannot truly be a spiritual leader of his movement along the lines of other Shiite clerics who lead political groups. At the same time, he also is not a political leader, in the hands-on sense, because he has to rely on other officials to further his political goals.
These two factors are likely threatening al-Sadr’s position as the leader of his movement. What has thus far prevented a complete loss of control is the fact that his followers have great respect for the al-Sadrite family — especially his father, Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr — and he is the sole heir to his father’s legacy and that of the wider al-Sadr clan. But he cannot rely on his family brand name to continue to hold on to his position.
Over time, religious elements within al-Sadr’s group could begin to challenge him on his religious qualifications — that is, if they have not already begun to do so. Meanwhile, it is only natural for the political elements — people who are more educated than al-Sadr himself — to ask themselves why they need to take orders from a seminary dropout, especially when his militia is out of control and a liability for the movement as a whole. This would explain reports that he is in the Iranian religious seminary town of Qom seeking to enhance his religious credentials.
Unfortunately for al-Sadr, the revolt already appears to be beginning. Several militiamen are violating his orders and engaging in sectarian violence, or have been co-opted by Iranian intelligence, while his political allies are trying to salvage their own positions by cutting deals with the U.S. military.
This would explain al-Sadr’s move to fire the two deputies and try to replace them with someone more loyal. Al-Sadr has replaced Cabinet members before in hopes of consolidating his position, but it did not solve the problems within the movement. There is a chance that he could succeed this time, but it looks as if he might be trying to plug holes in a sinking ship.
FARID GHADRY, SYRIAS CHALABI: FROM WASHINGTON TO DAMASCUS ( 3 / 3 )
Salim Abraham : Syria Comment
But Landis explains that Ghadry has play a role in the political struggle in Syria. His party played an important role, because he has good links inside the [Bush] administration and forced Washington to begin looking at the Syrian opposition as a potential tool in its anti-Syrian diplomacy. Ghadry also convinced other opposition parties to begin looking to Washington as a potential ally,” he said. “Whether one agrees or not with Ghadry’s methods or objectives, there is no denying that he was the first Syrian to convince the Bush administration to begin developing a Syria politicy that included the opposition.”
Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian scholar at the Washington-based Brookings Institute, also stressed that the best Ghadry can do, in my opinion, the best fortune he can have, is to play the role as a communicator between the internal Syrian opposition and external Syrian opposition.
He is trying to do that but to no avail so far, I believe, Abdulhamid added.
In order for him to play that role, Carpenter said, Farid knows that he needs to influence people. Indeed, Ghadry said he had many channels within the administration but he complains that leaders of opposition groups inside Syria marred his efforts. I have contacts with the Pentagon, the State Department and even with the White House, Ghadry said. I opened the doors for the opposition inside to use my connections. The opposition inside has no power and they cant move because they are besieged and restricted by the regime.
However, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhoods showed interest in Ghadrys efforts, seeing him as a vehicle to open up for them the already closed doors of Washington. We have contacts with Ghadry although we have differences with him, al-Bayanouni said.
But despite this relationship between the staunchly secular Ghadry and an Islamic party, Landis said, The Muslim Brotherhoods keep a distance. He went on: The Muslim Brotherhoods are wooing America and trying to overcome the administrations ban on talking to moderate Islamist parties; to this end, they must preserve a modicum of civility with Ghadry. They are not going to get in bed with him, however, which would destroy their credibility at home.
Encouraged by Khaddams break from the regime, al-Bayanouni turned his back to Ghadry. He announced on March 17 with Khaddam and other expatriate dissidents the formation of the National Salvation Front. At the end of the two-day meeting in the Belgian capital, which included other representatives of exiled, liberal and pro-democracy groups, the Front called on Syrians to stage anti-government demonstrations inside the tightly government-controlled country. The burgeoning front called for forming a six-month transitional government to take up the reins of power at the appropriate moment in order to avoid chaos and prepare for elections after toppling the Syrian regime.
The move was made to reassure Syrians that their country will not slip into violence the way Iraq did should they rebel against their government.
Of late, the Muslim Brotherhoods alliance with secular parties inside and outside Syria has been widely debated. Washington and secular Syrians fears run high that a democracy in Syria would bring Islamist to power. This fear was heightened after Egyptian parliamentary elections brought 88 members of Egypts Muslim Brotherhoods to the parliament and after Palestinian elections swept Hamas to power.
Nevertheless, Carpenter said Washington will continue to exert pressure on Syria to democratize. After those elections, Carpenter said, some people said: Ah now the United States will ease up its pressure. We wont, because our lesson from that election is that unless there is more political space, the only opposition to the regime are Islamists.
Although its membership is punishable by death in Syria, the brotherhood is believed to be able to mobilize the already high religious sentiment in the country. In order to assuage those fears and pave the way to join the Syrian mainstream opposition, the brotherhood has renounced its unpopular violent rebellion in the late 1970s and early 1980s against Assads father, Hafez.
Mohammad al-Habash, a legislator and the head of the Islamic Studies Center in Damascus, said 80 percent of Syrias Sunni Muslims are religiously conservative, while moderate Muslims represent only 20 percent. If democracy were to come, the Islamic presence will be more effective in political life.
But Habash, who promotes a moderate version of Islam, played down the brotherhoods influence on Syrias politics. Their history doesnt help to have people sympathize with them, Habash said, referring to brotherhoods rebellion.
Michel Kilo, a prominent writer and opponent of Assads regime, said before his arrest in May 2006 in a telephone interview from his home in Damascus that the brotherhood has accepted democracy as a basis for their political activity. Kilo, a Christian, continued, There is no problem to have a temporary understanding with the Muslim Brotherhoods, whose agenda includes establishing an Islamic state in Syria after Assads ouster.
But policymakers in Washington are divided on how to respond to religious groups, according to William Rugh, a retired U.S. ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.
There are people in the [U.S.] administration who say Islamists should be allowed, said Rugh. And there are people saying watch out before pushing for democracy.
Landis said the Pentagon supports the secular Ghadry, while the State Department supports both Ghadry and the SNC, which also joined the Damascus Declaration.
Weighing the brotherhoods growing importance in Syria, Ghadry said the constitution he is trying to promote must be secular but approved by the Muslim Brotherhoods.
Ghadry hopes that American support for him will ensure their approval of the constitution that might run against their religious beliefs which restrict women’s freedoms and stipulate an Islamic life style. Ghadry was playing on the brotherhoods willingness to open a dialogue with Washington for a possible regime change in Syria. But Carpenter said the Muslim Brotherhoods constitute a problem for U.S.s Syria policy. Its a false choice, he said.
But the head of the brotherhood since 1996, al-Bayanouni, emphasized his groups commitment to a pluralist Syria. We have stressed our commitment to establish a civil state, not religious, he said. Al-Bayanouni, born in 1938 in Aleppo, Syrias second largest city, recalled that the Muslim Brotherhood participated in election during the 1950s and formed coalitions with other Syrian parties, including the Baath, which was established by the Greek Orthodox Michel Aflak and conservative Sunni Salah Bitar in 1947.
After Khaddam openly accused Assad of ordering the killing of Hariri, the U.N. investigation team demanded early in January that Assad and his top Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa be interviewed. Serge Brammertz, who was appointed in January 2006 to take over the U.N. team investigating the Hariri killing, reported on March 14 to the U.N. that President Assad and then foreign minister Sharaa agreed for the first time to meet with him in April. Brammertz, a Belgian prosecutor, submited his most report detailing his findings in Hariris killing in March 2007.
I think we are waiting to see what the conclusion is of the U.N. investigation, said Carpenter. But I think it will certainly set the tone and stage for all that happens next in Syria.
With Iraqs post-Saddam violence in mind, Carpenter denied that the U.S. is seeking regime change by force. The [Syrian] government knows what we are seeking. What the international community has asked for is a dramatic change in behavior, Carpenter said. We want to see change in the political system. We want to see change in Syria’s foreign policy. We want to see change and openness.
Rugh attributed the U.S.s subordinate role to France in dealing with Syria to its problems in Iraq, where more than 2,100 American troops have been killed as of early January. He also expressed his belief that U.S. leverage inside Syria is not sufficient to force Damascus to respond to Washingtons demands. For example, the American policy was not enough to force Syria out, Rugh said. He was referring to Frances backing of U.S. efforts to have Syria pull its troops out of Lebanon.
Ghadry said he even dropped his call for a U.S. military invasion of Syria to topple Assad. Our success relies on Bashar Assads mistakes. He is our friend, Ghadry said.
Farid wants to rule, Hussam al-Deiri, a member of the executive committee of the SNC who worked with Ghadry on founding the council, said in an interview at his house in Georgetown, Washington. We do not accept Farid ruling us. However, he said the legitimacy of Ghadrys activism is unquestionable despite Ghadrys absence from Syria for more than 30 years. At least, his hands are not soaked in Syrians blood like the Assad regime, al-Deiri said.
Although they agree that without the superpowers intervention, the regime in Syria may survive years longer, both al-Deiri and Ghadry differ on methods. All we are asking of the American administration is to lift its protection off the Syrian regime, said al-Deiri. We do not want a military attack or a military coup. We want to move step by step in line with the opposition inside.
But Ghadry bluntly said he hasnt considered working with the dissidents inside the country since he founded his party. He slammed the Damascus Declaration as a piece of paper, no more, no less. Taking a sip of coffee, Ghadry continued, Our goal was to strengthen ourselves through our relations with the international community, the American administration and certain people.
U.S. officials, however, deny that Washington has a favorite politician for Syria. We have selected nobody to be our guy, Carpenter said in an interview at his office at the State Department late in February 2006. There is no Ahmad Chalabi scenario for Syria. He said of Ghadry, Its not for us to demand that he be included in anything. We are not going to lend the United States name to any specific individual to advance his or her objectives. Carpenter added: American policy is designed and devoted to building a network of contacts within the opposition.
Ghadry drives his luxurious computer-equipped BMW to Washington, D.C. almost daily to meet with media people and U.S. officials, including Richard Perle, to discuss steps to topple the [Syrian] regime.
But Ghadry, who aspires to rule Syria, knows that the path from the Potomac back to Damascus will not be easy.
And for Ghadry to join the mainstream opposition in Syria, he has to prove he is not part of an external design to weaken the country, said Kilo. The internal opposition agreed that we would not invite external [forces] to solve our problems and we would not give a hand to those who might shed the blood of Syrians, Kilo stressed, referring to Ghadrys call for American military intervention.
Al-Bayanouni, who lives in London, echoed the same sentiments. Syrian people do not accept the American agenda, He called on Ghadry to distance himself from the external agenda designed for his country.
But Ghadry sharply answered his critics. When we leave things for the [opposition] inside, they can not do anything, he said. Ghadry pointed to the slow pace of political movement inside Syria, saying, They have been working for 42 years to no avail. This shows political immaturity.
We are using this historic moment and our connections with the Bush administration to oust the regime, Ghadry said.
Mom, I want food, said the 24-year-old Omar, Ghadrys oldest son, who studied economics in college and works for a marketing firm in Washington, D.C. In many respects, Ghadry leads a typical American, suburban life in Washington.
Dalia, 18, Ghadrys youngest, pops out of her room. The high schooler asks her father about her Christmas gift. Christopher, Ghadrys third child, appears with his blonde, American girlfriend, Alex. The whole family was waiting for the long-haired, bearded Samer, Ghadrys fourth child, to come home from college for Christmas holidays.
Ghadry often switches between English and Arabic, but his children only speak flawless American English. For Ghadrys four children, America offers them opportunities he could not enjoy during his childhood; Syria is foreign to thema land without promise or even family.
But Ghadry is eagerly hoping to return to Syria and to create a niche in its politics for himselfthough not until it is liberated from Baath regime.
Ahlam, Ghadrys wife, agrees. She still speaks Lebanese-accented Arabic, and pines for her homeland. Like her husband, she hopes for better days in the Middle East. Our region has to change, she said. I fully support Farid because someone must work for change.
Ghadry assures her change in Syria is nearing.
I think its in the summer of 2006, Ghadry explained to me in January of that year. Everything indicates that the change is coming soon.
He looked at the vase where the two Lebanese flags were set and pointed his finger between them.
I will place the flag of new Syria here.
FIGHTING FOR THE SOUL OF ISLAM
How a decades-old crisis of authority affects the campaign against terrorism
By Jay Tolson
Posted 4/8/07
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070408/16muslims.htm
Americans have heard it repeatedly since September 11: The acts of terrorism inflicted on our shore were the murderous consequences of an ongoing struggle within Islam. At its most dramatic extremes, that conflict pits radical jihadists against moderate Muslims. But a quieter front in the struggle is probably of greater import. It involves the millions of Muslims who are being wooed by the proselytizers of a puritanical, and often highly politicized, strain of the faith. This volatile blend of Saudi Wahhabi Islam and political Islam-dubbed Islamism by one of its early-20th-century founders-is the assembly line of future jihadists, some experts hold, and its agents are busy indoctrinating young Muslims from Lahore to Los Angeles.
The outcome of this clash will bear directly on the course of the war on terrorism by answering the most fundamental question: Is mainstream Islam compatible with democracy and basic rights and freedoms established by international law?
While the stakes of this struggle are enormously high, American and European efforts to make sense of it have so far proved to be inadequate. A new Rand report, only the most recent such critique, charges that the U.S. government-almost six years after 9/11-still lacks a “consistent view on who the moderates are, where the opportunities for building networks among them lie, and how best to build the networks.”
The difficulties of identifying who speaks for Islam-much less whom the West would like to be speaking-were on ample display last month in Florida, where two groups of Muslim activists and concerned experts assembled for conferences on opposite coasts.
In St. Petersburg, the Secular Islam Summit, sponsored by a humanist organization called the Center for Inquiry, featured Muslim speakers who ranged from angry ex-believers to devout reformers. They differed sharply on particulars, but all shared the conviction that Islam must be compatible with secular democracy. Their closing manifesto, “The St. Petersburg Declaration,” affirmed the separation of mosque and state, gender equality in personal and family law, and unrestricted critical study of Islamic traditions.
Identity. On the same weekend, the south Florida office of the Council on American-Islamic Relations held its conference in Fort Lauderdale. Among its speakers, Geneive Abdo, a Lebanese-American (of Christian background) and author of Mecca and Main Street, discussed how young American Muslims have been strengthening their Islamic identity since 9/11.
At least as significant as the meetings themselves, however, were the denunciations hurled back and forth by attendees of the separate events. Repeatedly, speakers in St. Petersburg denounced CAIR as typifying fellow-traveling Islamism. Absorbed with grievance-group politics and hypersensitive to any criticism of Muslims, it receives, various speakers noted, generous funding from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. More disturbingly, as many in St. Petersburg pointed out, some CAIR officials have refused to denounce Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations, while others have been too quick to declare who is, or who is not, a true Muslim.
Playing to type, the executive director of the Tampa chapter of CAIR, Ahmed Bedier, dismissed the St. Petersburg crowd as a bunch of “atheists and non-Muslims” with no standing in the Muslim community. Later, in the Washington Post, Abdo observed that despite the attention western media lavish on secularized Muslims, they represent only a small minority. By contrast, those Muslims associated with CAIR, she wrote, “more closely reflect the views of the majority not only in the United States, but worldwide.”
Law of the land. And what does this majority want? Well, for one, Abdo explained, the implementation of Islamic sharia law as the law of the land for Muslim countries and even the restricted use of sharia within some western countries. Abdo concluded that Muslims living in the West are unlikely to be fully integrated into their societies, while nations in the Muslim world are likely to be “much more Islamic than western.”
To speakers at the Secular Islam Summit, accepting such views is giving up the cause without a fight. Yet the frequent intemperance of the secularists’ remarks, including the claim by the Syrian-American psychiatrist Wafa Sultan that there is no difference between “radical Islam and regular Islam,” played almost perfectly into the hands of CAIR. As its board chairman, Parvez Ahmed, noted, “The [Secular Islam Summit] drew an amalgam of extreme right-wing and neocon voices who touted as role models of ‘reform’ those who are deep in their hostility to Islam.”
Such mutual mudslinging only hints at the complexity of what has been going on within the house of Islam for over a century. And unfortunately, American attempts to make sense of it have been handicapped by ignorance of Islam and by our own partisan divides and culture wars.
Take the seemingly simple matter of reform and reformation. Repeatedly called for by westerners, a reformation is precisely what Islam has been undergoing since the late 19th century, largely in response to the perceived causes and consequences of western domination of Islamic lands.
New caliphate. While this reformation has had many tendencies and fathers, the most militant of the reformers hope to reassert a dominant role for Islam in all areas of life and society, particularly the political. (This is one reason that liberal and secular Muslims say Islam needs an Enlightenment, not another Reformation.) Rejecting secularists like Turkey’s Kemal Atatrk and harking back to the age of the first caliphates, ideologues like India-born Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi, Egypt’s Hassan al-Banna (founder of the Muslim Brotherhood), and fellow Egyptian Sayyid Qutb laid out the main lines of modern Islamist thought and action. Borrowing elements of European fascist ideology, they backed extensive social welfare programs while tirelessly promoting the idea of an Islamic state governed by Islamic sharia law. For some, the ultimate goal is the creation of a transnational community of believers, or umma, united under a new caliph. In addition to spawning organizations such as the Palestinians’ Hamas and Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, the Brotherhood has seen the emergence of rival groups boasting more militant, if not quite violent, programs. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), nearly banned in Britain after the London subway bombing, is now active in more than 40 countries and openly boasts of its ambition. “The winner of this battle [the ideological struggle] will decide whether the future belongs to Islam or western secular liberalism,” declares one official on the Australian HT website.
But the rise of Islamism is only part of what Columbia University historian Richard Bulliet calls, in a Wilson Quarterly article, “a crisis of authority that has been building within Islam for a century.” The crisis, which grows out of the religion’s decentralized and relatively weak authority structures, has undermined the power of the traditional ulema (the leading Muslim scholars), who once were able “to disqualify or overrule a man who does not speak-or act-for Islam.”
The crisis has three related causes, Bulliet argues. The first is the gradual marginalization of the leading sheiks and muftis, in part because of their close association with authoritarian governments that control the purse strings of important mosques and other religious establishments. The second factor is the emergence of self-proclaimed authorities with little traditional learning but superior mastery of the media. And the third cause is the spread of literacy, which has created a huge and receptive audience for those new voices.
This is not the first crisis of authority in Islam, Bulliet explains. In medieval times, Sunni legal schools proliferated to the point of anarchy, but four schools finally emerged as authoritative. Typically, voices on the periphery eventually become the new center. Today, Bulliet says, the fringe consists of three parts. There are diaspora Muslims in Europe and America, whose voices range from the Swiss activist Tariq Ramadan to thinkers like Iranian legal scholar Afshin Elian, now teaching in the Netherlands. The second part of the fringe is found in the major universities in predominantly Muslim countries outside the Middle East that combine traditional religious and modern studies rather than separate each, as in the universities in the Middle Eastern core. The third part of the fringe consists of the Islamist parties.
Bulliet believes that the United States needs to engage with all of these new players, including the Islamists, among whom he sees great variety. Dismissing them all as advocates of Taliban-style regimes, he charges, is like saying that “every socialist was a Stalinist.” Just as absurd, in his view, is the U.S. ban on Ramadan, who advocates an Islam fully compatible with western liberalism.
Shady. Such sentiments are dismissed by conservative activists like Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum, as the dangerous products of political correctness. And sometimes they are. Scholars in some American university Middle East programs (often recipients of generous Saudi bequests) manage to smell almost nothing bad in Islamist groups or CAIR-style organizations, however shady they may be. The liberals, meanwhile, see the conservatives as pro-Israel shills who want all Muslims to be secularized Jeffersonian democrats. Not surprisingly, both camps have influenced different parts of the U.S. government, where conflicting ideological agendas often subvert consistent policies.
Yet some of the rigid positions are changing. Conservatives and neocon-servatives are at least entertaining the idea of engaging with the Islamists. Former CIA operative Reuel Marc Gerecht, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has argued that the road to democracy in Muslim states will inevitably involve Islamist groups. Other conservatives, including Robert Leiken, director of the Immigration and National Security Program at the Nixon Center, are now making the case that some Islamist groups are modifying their views. He points out, in a coauthored article in Foreign Affairs, that the Brotherhood-founded Muslim Association of Britain has earned praise from Scotland Yard for “deradicalizing” young militants. Diversity within Islamist groups, he concludes, “suggests Washington should adopt a case-by-case approach, letting the situation in each individual country determine when talking with-or even working with-the Brotherhood is feasible and appropriate.”
Other conservative scholars insist that engagement with Islamists is tantamount to legitimizing them. But retired Ambassador William Rugh counters, “They are already legitimized. Our not talking to them doesn’t make a difference.”
Some liberal Middle East experts say that we should be asking the Islamists to be more clear on what exactly they stand for. In a policy paper, three Carnegie Endowment associates, Amr Hamzawy, Marina Ottaway, and Nathan Brown, call for clarification in six “gray zones”: application of sharia, violence, political pluralism, individual freedoms, minorities, and women’s rights. So, for example, engaging the Brotherhood in Egypt should mean getting clear answers on whether it supports full tolerance of Coptic Christians and on what it means by sharia-a set of general ethical principles or a narrowly restrictive code of rules and punishments.
Turkish political economist Zeyno Baran, director of the Hudson Institute’s Center for Eurasian Policy, supports that kind of “engagement for a purpose,” but she still fears that emphasizing Islamists can further imperil the plight of moderate, secular Muslims, who are feeling squeezed from every direction. Not that America has been deft in approaching them. “They don’t want to be seen doing the bidding of the U.S. government,” Baran says. “They don’t want to become anybody’s good Muslims.”
So, what, if anything, can the United States do, even if it is simply to do no harm? Some have called for a radically different kind of organization dedicated to dealing with the war within Islam, an organization that is sensitive, above all, to the power of culture and religion. “Just as we created the OSS to deal with the challenge of the Axis powers in World War II, so we now need an organization to come to terms with this new, religiously grounded ideological struggle,” says Ross Newland, a former CIA station chief. This outfit-call it, tentatively, the Organization of Islamic Affairs-would not be a government agency, though it would receive funding from the government. An independent think tank and advocacy group, it would employ a range of specialists, including foreign nationals, to give direction and coherence to government programs. Above all, its specialists would know how to listen to what is going on in the Muslim world. As things are now, says Williams College political scientist Marc Lynch, “we don’t listen to the terms in which Muslims are carrying on their debates. Or we listen through American filters.”
Terms of Conflict
Wahhabism: A puritanical strain of Islam set forth in the 18th century, now being spread by Saudi wealth.
Islamism: A variety of modern reform Islam that aims to “restore” the religion to political power.
Caliph: A successor to the Prophet Muhammad. Kemal Atatrk abolished the Ottoman caliphate in 1924. Some Islamists hope to create a new, transnational caliphate.
Sharia: Islamic law. Understood by moderates as broad ethical principles; by puritans, as a set of narrow prohibitions and punishments.
ISLAMOPHOBIA: A CALL TO CONFRONTING A CREEPING DISEASE
By Louay Safi
Wednesday, March 28, 2007
http://aninsight.org/2007/03/islamophobia-call-to-confronting_28.html
President Bush reacting to the unearthing of the alleged bombing plot over the Atlantic August 10 remarked: “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation.”
On Aug. 7, during a press conference from his ranch in Texas, he said terrorists “try to spread their jihadist message – a message I call … Islamic radicalism, Islamic fascism”. A moment later, he said “Islamo-fascism” was an “ideology that is real and profound”. White House spokesman Tony Snow told the Atlanta Journal-Constitution Aug. 11 that the president will continue to use the phrase.
This is not the first time that Bush and members of his Administration have used this deliberate coupling of Islam with evil ideologies or actions, such as fascism or terrorism. Bush referred to Islamo-fascism in his address to the National Endowment for Democracy, Oct. 6, 2005. Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) addressing Christians United for Israel (CUFI) held their first Washington-Israel Summit in Washington D.C., July 2006, declaring Islamic fascism is a mosaic
Media baron Rupert Murdoch pontificated in Sydney, Australia June 26, 2006: “You have to be careful about Muslims who have a very strong, in many ways a fine, but very strong religion which supercedes any sense of nationalism wherever they go.”
The term is coined, and was initially used, by radical Zionist pundits and their allies in the Far Right, and is intended to drive a wedge between Western and Muslim communities. The fact that it is already being used by President Bush and his top lieutenant underscore the extent to which Islamophobia is gradually creeping into public discourse.
Blaming Islam and Muslims for the rise of terrorism that threatens the U.S. and the West is at the heart of the strategy developed by individuals and groups whose systemic attacks on Islam and Muslims, borne out of either ignorance or hatred, constitute the recent and painful reality : Islamophobia.
Islamophobia reflects an attitude and a posture normally associated with the Far Right, but that has been creeping slowly to the center of political debate. Islam and Muslims are separated out from the citizenry and increasingly presented as a problem to be addressed and a question to be tackled. The last time a world religion was considered a problem and a question was in late-nineteenth-century Europe. Then, the Jewish Question was widely debated by both the enlightened and bigots among European thinkers.
Islamophobia is a strategic weapon in the campaign to marginalize Muslim Americans by ideological extremists and paranoid bigots. On one level, Islamophobia stems from ignorance, deception, and misrepresentation. On a deeper level, however, it stems from a very basic human instinct to dominate, exploit, and abuse, combined with a unscrupulous attitude that refuse to recognize moral principles and boundaries. While Islamophobia has existed for centuries, perhaps the term became public in Europe in the 1990s. Today, some are recognizing this creeping disease may even be prompted to confront it. In 2001, some concerned Britons formed The Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR; www.fairuk.org/intro.htm); and in Dec. 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan hosted a seminar on Confronting Islamophobia: Education for Tolerance and Understanding.
The Council of Europe defines Islamophobia as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them”. Matti Bunzl, Associate Professor Department of Anthropology University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign, in his paper Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Some thoughts on the new Europe (American Ethnologist 32(4): 499-508) argues: Whereas traditional anti-Semitism has run its historical course with the supersession of the nation-state, Islamophobia threatens to become the defining condition of the new Europe.
In Britain, the term Islamophobia was not used in government policy until 1997, when the race relations think tank Runnymede Trust published the report Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All
(http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/pdfs/islamophobia.pdf). In a section entitled The Nature of Islamophobia, the report itemizes eight features that Runnymede attributed to Islamophobia:
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Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change.
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Islam is seen as separate and other. It does not have values in common with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them.
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Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and sexist.
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Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism, and engaged in a Clash of Civilizations [an idea enunciated by and latter elaborated by Samuel P. Huntington, with the publication of his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Simon & Schuster; 1998].
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Islam is seen as a political ideology, used for political or military advantage.
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Criticisms made of ‘the West’ by Islam are rejected out of hand.
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Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
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Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural and normal.
The twentieth century witnessed great struggles all over the world to overcome bigotry and racism, and to create more open and inclusive societies in which different races, ethnicities, and religions live side-by-side and cooperate for the betterment of society. After many devastating tragedies and wars, including two world wars that wiped out more than 80 million people, a holocaust, and a long civil rights struggle, chauvinism, racism, and bigotry were finally condemned, though not totally rejected. By the mid-twentieth century, the concept that individuals must be treated on the basis of their individual characters and actions, and that no individual or group should be targeted on the basis of religious, ethnic, racial, or national affiliations became widely accepted.
Therefore, the recent efforts that aim at presenting Islam as a challenge and Muslims who practice their faith as a problem are both disheartening and disquieting. They represent a dangerous move to reverse human progress and return to the age of outright racism and intolerance. This renewed focus on Islam as a problem has been justified by invoking security concerns. Many voices, particularly within the U.S. policymaking community, either out of ignorance or prejudice, decided to place the blame for terrorism squarely at the door of Islam.
The decision to ignore complex and painful realities that give rise to discord and tension between Western and Muslim countries, and to blame it all on a major world religion and its practitioners, will only exacerbate an already dire situation. This exercise in self-delusion can only distract us from confronting the real sources of the concerns on both sides and delay the efforts to bring forth a permanent and lasting solution. Meanwhile, tremendous resources are wasted, and the credibility and prestige of the United States are being undermined.
The failure to understand the profound changes taking place in the Muslim world is not simply a matter of ignorance and lack of insight into Muslim cultures, but a reflection of the bewildering stubbornness of neoconservative analysts in the U.S. and Europe, and their comfort in employing the archaic Orientalist attitudes and tools to analyze relationships between the West and the Muslim world. Muslims are not awarded the dignity of equal human beings with intrinsic values and legitimate concerns, but are often presented as thoughtless and violent masses incapable of articulating their conditions and solving their problems. Consequently, no effort is made to initiate dialogue and exchange, and all energy is focused on devising strategies for the manipulation and control of the Muslim world.
Many self-proclaimed experts on Islam continue to behave as if Islam and Muslims are a distant part of reality and an external problem to address, rather than partners for dealing with common problems and challenges. An increasing number of Muslims are proud Americans, serving American society as professors, businessmen, medical doctors, engineers, lawyers, sport stars, firefighters, police officers, and teachers. Many experts in Middle East and Islamic Studies departments have their ancestral roots in Middle Eastern and Muslim cultures. Many Muslim Americans are active in the debate on how best to bridge the divide, or at least change the perceptions of a divide, between the Muslim world and the West.
The Far Right
In Islamophobia, the Extreme Right has finally found a clever way to arrest Americas march toward asserting its foundational principles of equality, religious freedom, and the rule of law. Their strategy is to transform the war on terror into a war against Islam and use security needs to subvert constitutional protections. The Extreme Right draws its ranks from the fringes of the Christian Right and the neoconservatives, particularly those who see in the indigenization of Islam and the presence of authentic Muslim voices in the U.S. a direct threat to their ability to manipulate the public and promote their narrow religious and foreign policy agendas.
The 9/11/2001 tragedy has given a new impetus to the campaign against Islam and Muslims, as the Far Right discovered that the climate of heightened fear and uncertainty provides an exceptional opportunity to advance their bigoted and racist agenda under the guise of patriotism. They have focused in the last four years on turning Islam into an enemy. In their efforts to demonize Islam and Muslims, they have persistently advanced two themes: (1) that Islam is intolerant, violent, and anti-western, and must not, therefore, be allowed a legitimate place in American society, and (2) that Muslim Americans who assert their Islamic identity, and express positive views of Islam cannot be trusted, and must be chastised and marginalized.
Although their fanatical views were initially rejected by mainstream America, the post-9/11 environment of confusion and fear provided them with a unique opportunity to advance their racist agenda. Their views and arguments have steadily gained more receptive ears among key agencies and leaders in the Bush administration. Not only have they succeeded in creating doubts in the White House and the Congress about mainstream Muslim American organizations and leaders, but they, evidently, have succeeded in injecting their language into the political discourse of public institutions and government agencies. Senior administration figures have moved from calling the current war against groups involved in indiscriminate killing of civilians a war on terrorism to a war on Islamic terrorism, Islamist terrorism, and radical Islam. Most recently, top leaders in the Bush administration, including George Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld have accepted the argument, popular among the Extreme Right that the war on terror aims at preventing Muslim extremists from establishing an Islamic Caliphate and an Islamic Empire.
Have the Extreme Right succeeded in pushing their extremist views on Islam and Muslim into mainstream political discourse? Are those who want to turn the war on terror into a war on Islam getting the ears of government agencies and political leaders? And what can we do to expose the Extreme Rights deceptions and bring peace to a world that continues to drift toward turmoil and upheaval?
Demonizing Islam
Ever since George Bush, rushing to defuse the post 9/11 tension, described Islam as a religion of peace, the Far Right sprung to action to challenge the Administrations position and to generate ill-will toward Islam and Muslims in the U.S. and Europe. The anti-Islam fanatics have been working hard to demonize Islam and marginalize Muslim Americans. Using their propaganda machinery, and occasionally likeminded individuals in key governmental agencies, the Extreme Right have been able to confuse the public about Islam and Muslims, by using half-truths, innuendos, and sheer fabrications and lies.
Their tactics of confusing the public, painting all Muslims as potential terrorists, and presenting Islam as the source of hate and violence have brought them limited successes, including profiling of Muslims in airports, smearing the good name of mainstream Muslim American organizations, and intimidating Muslim leaders and activists through repeated interviews by security agencies.
The anti-Islam fanatics have made it known that they are not happy with their limited success, and continue to drive at a complete crackdown by law enforcement agencies on all forms of Muslim organizations. They seem to have made a breakthrough if a recent report by Paul Perry, an anti-Islam writer, turns to be correct. Perry, the author of Infiltration: How Muslim Spies and Subversives have Penetrated Washington (Nelson Current; 2005), reported that a Pentagons intelligence agency, the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), has embarked on a project to understand Islam by studying the Quran and the life of Prophet Muhammad (ITALICS salla Allahu alayhi wa sallam). Citing an internal document allegedly obtained from CIFA, Perry contends that the CIFA document notes that unlike Judaism and Christianity, Islam advocates expansion by force. The final command of jihad, as revealed to Muhammad in the Quran, is to conquer the world in the name of Islam. The defense briefing adds that Islam is also unique in classifying unbelievers as “standing enemies against whom it is legitimate to wage war.
“Muhammad’s behaviors today would be defined as radical,” Perry quotes the document, and Muslims today are commanded by their militant holy book to follow his example. It adds: Western leaders can no longer afford to overlook the cult characteristics of Islam.”
Perry further contends that the CIFA document ties Muslim charity to war. Zakat, the alms-giving pillar of Islam, is described in the briefing as an asymmetrical war-fighting funding mechanism, which in English translates to: combat support under the guise of tithing.
It is shocking to learn that a public agency can sink to this level unless it is fed by the anti-Islam campaign. While Perrys words cannot be trusted, Americans worried about abuse of public agencies for turning the war on terror into a war on Islam cannot afford to take chances. The Extreme Right has already succeeded in persuading the Bush administration to appoint a war monger to the United State Institute of Peace (USIP), and it took a great effort to make the divisive agenda of Daniel Pipes clear to the USIP board, leading to his demise as a USIP director.
Cloaked Racism
The events that shook the U.S. on 9/11/2001 represent a watershed for the anti-Islam campaign. The brutality of these attacks, and the indiscriminate terror unleashed by the fanatics, has raised many questions in the mind of Americans about the connection between Islam and terrorism. American interest in understanding Islam and deciphering the connection between the act of terrorism and the Islamic faith led to a sharp increase in the number of books published on Islam. While few of the books published since 9/11 provide a balanced views of Islams teachings and history, most aim at demonizing Islam and Muslims. Of the 30 bestsellers by Amazon.com, by far the largest online distributor, 19 promote views that range between the negative and abusive, while 8 advance more favorable views of Islam. Three books offer neutral views on Islam. The eight positive books include two translations of the Quran and two on the renowned Muslim mystic Al Rumi. The anti-Islam books that dominate the Amazon bestsellers include books by well-known hate mongers and Muslim bashers who made careers out of demonizing Islam and attacking Muslims, including Robert Spencer, David Horowitz, Tony Blankley, and Steven Emerson. At the heart of the writings of these four, and other collaborators, is a racist strategy whose aim is to persuade American leaders, and the public at large, that Islam is the enemy and that Muslims cannot be trusted.
The authors of anti-Islam books are not scholars who are objectively interested in understanding Islam and Muslims, but a group of activists who deeply committed to promoting an expansionist foreign policy. They perceive world politics as a zero-sum game that requires the U.S. to use its military power against present and future competitors. They have consistently presented Muslim countries as incapable of democratic rule, and Islamic values as antithetical to world peace and religious diversity.
To ensure that their views are not challenged by the academic community, the Extreme Right has been working hard to undermine academic freedom and intimidate scholars with balanced views of the Middle East. Martin Kramers Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP — October 2001) is a diatribe against Middle East Studies in U.S. universities, and Daniel Pipes Campus Watch, an organization devoted to smearing professors critical of U.S. foreign policy and Tel Avivs treatment of Palestinians, have initiated a new campaign that aims at intimidating free thinking on the Middle East and silencing any views that challenge the Extreme Rights propaganda. Stanford professor Joel Beinin (Le Monde diplomatique, Spring 2006) described WINEP as pro-Tel Aviv think tank.
Concerted Efforts to misrepresent Islam
The anti-Islam campaign is carried by self-appointed experts who have little understanding of Islam and Muslims, yet are bent on depicting the faith of 1/5th of humanity as intolerant, violent, and anti-western. Having little insight into Muslim societies and Islamic faith, and history, they often rely on the crude and faulty logic of generalization about Muslims from the experiences of fringe Muslim groups, and of reading Islamic texts out of context, both the socio-political and the discursive.
Robert Spencer, a prolific anti-Islam writer and a leading Islamophobe who is bent on distorting Islam and demonizing Muslims, has persistently argued that violence and terrorism employed by Muslim extremists is rooted in the Quran and its message. Spencer calls the Quran, the jihadists Mein Kampf, in reference to Hitlers memoir. He blames the Quran for giving impetus to the terrorist open war against the West. He declares: So is the Qur’an the Mein Kampf of the totalitarian, supremacist movement that is the global Islamic jihad? If we take seriously the words of the book itself and how they are used by jihadists, then it clearly is their inspiration and justification (FrontPageMagazine.com December 8, 2005). Spencer contends: Nor are these jihadists misrepresenting, twisting, or hijacking what the Quran says. There are over a hundred verses in the Quran that exhort believers to wage jihad against unbelievers. O Prophet! Strive hard against the unbelievers and the hypocrites, and be firm against them. Their abode is Hell, an evil refuge indeed (Sura 9:73). Strive hard in Arabic is jahidi, a verbal form of the noun jihad. This striving was to be on the battlefield: When you meet the unbelievers in the battlefield, strike off their heads and, when you have laid them low, bind your captives firmly (Quran 47:4). This is emphasized repeatedly: O ye who believe! Fight the unbelievers who gird you about, and let them find firmness in you: and know that Allah is with those who fear Him. (Quran 9:123).
Spencer picks few out of the hundreds verses that deal with issues of peace and war, and misrepresents Islam by arguing that the Quran directs Muslims to fight non-Muslims on the account of having different faith. He does that by obscuring both the textual and historical contexts of the verses he cites. The Quran is unequivocal that fighting is a last resort and is permitted to repulse aggression and stop oppression and abuse: A declaration of disavowal from God and His Messenger to those of the polytheists (Arab pagans) with whom you contracted a Mutual alliance. (9:1)
The reason for this war against the pagans was their continuous fight and conspiracy against the Muslims to turn them out of Medina as they had been turned out of Makkah, and their infidelity to and disregard for the covenant they had made with the Muslims: Why you not fight people who violated their oaths, plotted to expel the Messenger, and attacked you first (9:13). Out of the hundreds of the Quranic verses left out of Spencers discussion are those that direct Muslims to initiate fighting only to repel aggression while urging them to seek peace when the other party seeks peace: Fight in the way of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression, for God loves not aggressors. And fight them wherever you meet them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for persecution is worse than slaughter. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no oppression and the religion is only for God, but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression. (2:190-193)
The Specter of Islamic Empire
In an effort to link extremism to the larger Muslim communities and organizations, the Extreme Right has repeatedly exaggerated the size of extremists among Muslims, and obscured their identity and the political conditions leading to their emergence. In order to instill fear of Islam in the heart of Americans and Europeans, the Far Right contends that mainstream Muslim communities and organizations in the West are part of a global movement with wild aspirations and grandiose design to control the world and impose institutions and laws borrowed from 7th century Muslim society. It is true that fringe groups within Muslim societies espouse literalist views of Islamic sources and history. Yet the Far Right not only fails in identifying these groups as the exception to the rule, but they have erroneously presented them as the only voice in Muslim communities.
Similarly, mainstream Muslim organizations are depicted as supportive of global terrorism and Muslim American leaders and activists as fifth column. These organizations have been the target of a smear campaigns in which innuendo, half-truth, and guilt by association have been employed to undermine and disrupt their efforts to integrate the Muslim American community into mainstream American society.
In the last three years, mainstream Muslim organizations have been the subject of rough treatment by law enforcement agencies under the urging of the Far Right. In 2002 the offices of the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), the highest Muslim religious authority in the North America, and the Graduate School of Islamic and Social Sciences (GSISS), a major Muslim institution of higher learning for training Muslim chaplains, were raided by federal agents, led by an agent of the customs service who apparently relied heavily on information provided by the Steven Emersons Investigative Project and his former assistant Rita Katzs SITE Institute. Although the raids were publicized as an important operation in the war on terrorism, three years after the offices of these, and other Muslim institutions were searched and hundreds of documents confiscated, no criminal charges were returned, and the Justice and Homeland Security Departments made no apology.
In June 2003, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information held a series of hearings on radicalization of Muslim inmates. Several Extreme Right spokesmen accused Muslim chaplains of promoting radical views. Indeed, the anti-Islam pressure groups succeeded in persuading Sen. Schumer (D-NY) that GSISS and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) have been promoting Wahhabi Islam and demanded that the Justice Department conduct an investigation to uncover radical Islamic activities in federal prisons. A year later, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Justice Department issued a report that showed that, contrary to these claims, Muslim chaplains made a positive impact and brought balanced and moderate teachings to Muslim inmates, and that radicalization was more likely in prisons where inmates did not have Muslim chaplains. Federal correction facilities officials further testified that, contrary to the claims of the self-proclaimed experts who provided Sen. Schumer with erroneous information, ISNA is a moderate, mainstream, non-Wahhabist, Islamic organization that encompasses Muslims from several Islamic sects.
In Dec. 2003, the Senate Finance Committee listed Muslim organizations and charities on a suspect list, and asked the IRS to provide financial records to uncover alleged support for global terrorism. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) stated in an interview with the Indianapolis Star that his committee did not find anything alarming enough that required additional follow-up beyond what law enforcement is already doing. A week later, the Committee, apparently under pressure from the Extreme Right, issued a press release, reversing Grassleys statement, and contending that the fact that Committees conclusion of reviewing the information it received from the IRS does not mean that these groups have been cleared by the committee.”
Creeping Islamophobia
Islamophobia is no more the attitude of the marginal extremists, as it has colored the writings and analyses of mainstream research organization such as the RAND Corporation and Freedom House. The RAND report on Islam (Cheryl Benard: Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies; 2004; and the 567-page study The Muslim World After 9/11; 2004) makes no efforts to seriously engage authentic Arab and Muslim voices for more accurate information on Islam and Muslim Americans.
The same attitude permeates other think tanks and policy formation groups.
In an 89-page study, published in 2005 under the title, Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology Fill American Mosques, the Freedom House made sweeping and largely inaccurate generalizations about Muslim Americans. After collecting a few copies of some Saudi publications that their researchers alleged were found on the library shelves of fifteen mosques, they accused mosques across the nation of promoting hate. The Freedom House found it quite permissible to smear every mosque in the U.S. without conducting a single interview, or inquiring about the reasons and circumstances of carrying questionable Saudi publications. There are more than two thousand mosques in the U.S., and fifteen out of two thousand mosques constitute less than 1 percent of all mosques in the country.
Evidently, the authors never stopped for a second to ask: How has the presence of the Saudi literature impacted the attitudes of the mosque-goers? They have also failed to consider asking the leaders of the Islamic centers about their views and activities, or how the Saudi material was used. One would think that this is the most reasonable and sensible thing to do in a study that aims at ascertaining the truth and enhancing understanding.
Islamophobia has contaminated public discourse on Islam and Muslims, and has affected the best judgment of religious and political leaders, and, hence, has made the efforts to deal with terrorism more complicated and less effective and led to a long series of missteps. Let us recall the most serious ones:
In 2001 and 2002, bigotry and intolerance were elevated to a tolerable national discourse by leading Evangelical leaders who insulted Islam and its Prophet, and did it with impunity. Franklin Graham, Jerry Falwell, and Pat Robertson described Islam as “wicked, violent and not of the same god,” and called the Prophet of Islam a terrorist and pedophile, and were allowed to get away with it. Little has been done so far to rein in Christian and Jewish extremists.
In November 2002, John Ashcroft, then the U.S. attorney general, got away with similar bigoted remarks when he asserted that Islam is a religion in which God requires you to send your son to die for him, while Christianity is a faith in which God sends his son to die for you. Ashcroft never denied that he made the statement, nor did he apologize despite demands by several Muslim American organizations to retract his statement. In the same year Ashcroft made his remarks, the Department of Justice embarked on a massive detention and deportation of thousands of innocent Muslim immigrants in the name of fighting terrorism. Many of those who were detained were denied visitation by family members and representation by lawyers. Deprived from the due process enshrined in the US constitution, they were eventually deported on minor violations.
In October 2003, Lt. Gen. William G. Boykin, the deputy undersecretary of defense for intelligence, was allowed to keep his job after telling church gatherings that the Christian God is real and the Muslim is idol.” Secretary Rumsfeld defended Baykins bigoted remarks by citing the latter’s freedom of speech.
In December 2003, the military accused Capt. James Lee, a dedicated Muslim Chaplain and West Point graduate, of spying, and ordered his incarceration in a maximum security facility, but failed to provide any evidence to back up these serious charges. Chaplain Yee was eventually found innocent of all charges laid against him, including charges of adultery and pornography concocted when the spying charges were withdrawn. The army refused to issue an apology and Lee resigned.
In May 2004, Brandon Mayfield, a Muslim lawyer and former Army officer, was arrested by FBI agents in connection with the Madrid terrorist bombing. The FBI maintained its certainty that Mayfields fingerprints matched those found on bags left behind by the terrorists even after Spanish authorities said that the original image of the fingerprint did not match Mayfields. He was eventually released after spending two weeks in prison.
In December 2004, the open season on Islam and Muslims by extreme Religious Right pundits reached a new low, when the Washington Times, a leading American newspaper, published an article by Sam Harris, entitled “Mired in a Religious War.” The article declared Islam the enemy, and openly advocates an all-out war on Islam and Muslims.
In December 2004, 46 American Muslims were fingerprinted, searched and held for 6 hours by U.S. border security agents upon returning from a religious conference in Canada. The incident is the latest in a series of overzealous ethnic and religious profiling, and of the targeting of law-abiding American Muslims in the name of national security.
The above list, though far from being complete, reveals disturbing patterns of Muslim bashing and abuse, and underscores the troubling fact that some public officials in various departments and at highest levels espouse prejudices toward Islam and Muslims. While the number of bigots and zealots is still limited, the damage they have done to both American Muslims and the reputation of the United States is enormous.
This attitude toward Islam and Muslims, and the policy recommendations that stem from it, have so far led to continuous radicalization of Muslim societies and have strengthened the very divisive forces that desire to marginalize and eliminate Islam and Muslims in the West. Many of the complex challenges the United States faces are the outcome of a faulty or unbalanced foreign policy, formulated from information supplied by ill-informed, Islamophobic experts. These policies are the result of defining adversaries on the ground of ethnic and religious identities, rather than universal ethical principles and actions, which include respect for the religious sensibilities of others
While both truth and vanity play a role in shaping Islamophobia, I am less concerned with the vain sources of these sentiments that take the form of deception, jealousy, and arrogance. I am more concerned, however, with the true sources of Islamophobia, namely anti-Muslim attitude and exclusivist political ideologies that fuel extremism. U.S. foreign policy, as articulated by the neo-conservatives, is bent on dominating and manipulating Muslim societies for achieving narrow economic and geopolitical interests; similarly, exclusivist ideologies continue to inflame the vicious terror campaigns that justify the killing of civilians for achieving political ends.
Rethinking US Foreign Policy
The war on terror has not contributed so far to isolating the terrorists, but seems to have led to increasing anti-American sentiments. The Bush administration has been ill-advised by individuals and groups driven by anti-Islam agenda that made an already difficult war even more complicated. By listening to prejudiced and bigoted voices who have shown little respect to the followers of the Islamic faith, and who have urged the administration to exceed established moral and legal limitations, the Bush administration has made several blunders that undermined the credibility of the United States.
From Guantanamo, Abu Ghuraib, and other abuses, to massive detention and deportation of Muslim immigrants, to profiling the predominantly law abiding Muslim Americans, to letting off the hook high ranking officials caught making derogatory and bigoted remarks about Islam and its followers, to denying visas and turning back from U.S. airports Muslim leaders who have been working hard to build bridges between Islam and the West, to supporting authoritarian regimes implicated in human rights violations, the Bush administration has adopted the wrong approach and gave the wrong impression that the war on terror is gradually shifting from targeting individuals implicated in terrorism and indiscriminate violence to targeting mainstream Muslim communities and organizations.
The Bush administration should reject the racist strategy of the Far Right and become more discreet in executing the war and terrorism, making a clear distinction between fringe groups driven by hatred and fanaticism, and the overwhelming majority of law abiding Muslims who aspire for just peace. The administration should also enlist the help and the crucial resources that the American Muslim community, and mainstream Muslim organizations and leaders, can bring to bear on the war on terrorism and extremism. It is not difficult for any person aware of the patterns of U.S. foreign policy toward the Muslim world, and of the terror campaign conducted by militant Muslims, to see that the two are interrelated and feed one another. The U.S. has for decades supported dictatorships and corrupt military regimes in the name of maintaining stability, and those regimes have bred extremism and gave rise to terrorist groups.
Yet the fact that U.S. foreign policy feeds into, and is fed by, the rise of extremism and terrorism in Muslim countries does not mean that we are moving in a vicious circle. The U.S. is in a position to end the cycle of violence and counter-violence, and American Muslims are well situated to help in redirecting U.S. foreign policy and in bridging the deepening divide between Muslim and Western societies. There are reasons to believe that after 9/11, the Bush Administration has become increasingly aware of the pitfalls of supporting autocratic regimes in the Muslim world, and has made several readjustments in its foreign policy approach toward Muslim countries. Not only is the Administration increasingly reluctant to openly support military and authoritarian regimes, but is increasingly coming to terms with the fact that no democratic government is possible without the involvement of Islamically-oriented political groups, as developments in Turkey and Iraq have demonstrated.
This does not mean that the Bush Administration has undergone a profound change of attitude; nor does it mean that the Administration has distanced itself from unilateralism and military preeminence that led to the war in Iraq. John Bolton, a neo-conservative unilateralist, was appointed US ambassador to the UN. This is the same Bolton who, more than two years ago, expressed an utter contempt toward international law and the UN. It is a big mistake for us, he wrote, to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do sobecause, over the long term, the goal of those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States.
We must reject the neoconservatives obsession with domination and empire building. Their drive to ensure the political and military dominance of the U.S. might appear at first glance patriotic, but in actuality it is undermining the political and moral standing of the U.S by undermining democracy and freedom at home and rolling back the most important American achievements on the world stage: international law and the UN.
Muslims Must Stand Up
Muslim Americans are well positioned to expose the deceptions of power hungry unilateralists, and bridge the divide between Muslim and Western countries. They should equally reject the bigoted spirit of exclusivist ideologies that use religion in all its forms as a weapon for achieving political supremacy, and demonize and dehumanize political opponents. Muslim Americans should take a firm and resolute stance against individuals and groups that use violence and terror against civilians in the name of religion, and condemn all campaigns of terrorism by groups like al-Qaeda, as they do condemn those who justify violence and aggression against Muslims in the name of biblical prophecies and religious supremacy.
The time has come for the world to undertake a profound shift in political thinking and practice, similar to the one achieved in Europe in modern times. A democratic and free Europe came to life when the feudal system that privileged a small class of European elites was rejected and replaced with a system based on political equality and the rule of law. A democratic and free world will be achieved when the current political structure that perpetuates political and economic disparity is replaced with one in which all are equally treated under international law, and have fairly equal access to international organizations.
For two centuries, America has shown that it is capable of transcending its limitations and marching behind those who struggle to realize the ideals of freedom, justice, and equality. And throughout its history, America stood behind those who fought for equal rights and equal dignity against self-centered groups that wanted to preserve their privileges. American Muslims must take a firm stand against the militant Religious Right that is bent on denying them the equal dignity they deserve. As long as they uphold the values of freedom, justice, and equal dignity for all, and reach out to other fellow Americans who share with them deep commitment to these values, they are destined, with the grace of God, to defeat the unscrupulous and mean-spirited attacks led by hate mongers and religious bigots.
FORMER U.S. DIPLOMAT INTERPRETS ISLAM
Newly settled in Montana, Dave Grimland tries to balance negative images of the Muslim world.
By Sam Howe Verhovek, Times Staff Writer
April 1, 2007
PLENTYWOOD, MONT. Dave Grimland spent nearly 30 years as a foreign service officer “telling the U.S. side of the story,” he says in Bangladesh, India, Cyprus, Turkey and other nations with large Muslim populations. He wrote ambassadors’ speeches, arranged cultural gatherings, and more than once hunkered down as angry mobs gathered outside the embassy to protest American policy.
Now retired and living in rural Montana, Grimland is once again telling a side of the story only this time, in quiet pockets of the Big Sky State, he’s trying to tell the Muslim side to non-Muslim Americans.
“I’m going to ask you, at least for this evening, to try to put on a pair of Muslim glasses and see what the world looks like,” Grimland said one recent night to about 40 ranchers, farmers and others in the basement of the county library near the spot where Montana, North Dakota and Saskatchewan meet.
Outside, it was snowing and 16 degrees. The nearest mosque was about 120 miles away, in Regina. Many in the audience said they had never met a Muslim other than Plentywood High School exchange student Alisher Taylonzoda, from Tajikistan.
For two hours and 40 minutes including a brief break for cider and baked goods the Montanans listened intently as Grimland covered a sweeping amount of history and made a case that the vast majority of Muslims are like the great majority of Christians, Jews or Buddhists.
“No worse; no better,” he said. “They want peace. They want to live their lives.”
A soft-spoken man of 63, Grimland has traveled to dozens of churches, schools, small-town gathering halls and Indian reservations.
He brings along a black roller suitcase crammed with books, magazine articles and photocopies of slightly blurry maps, timelines, and “further study” reading lists for those interested in the history of Islam.
Talking to a dozen people there, 40 here, as many as 75 elsewhere, Grimland hardly expects to change the world. But he does feel a calling.
“I’d been frustrated ever since 9/11 by listening to comments [about] the backwardness of Islam, about the religion’s responsibility for the 9/11 tragedy, versus the actions of a small number of Islamic extremists.”
And so, Grimland said, “I just thought maybe I could try to help people who haven’t traveled, who haven’t had the benefit of having to know this stuff because it was part of their job.”
He didn’t come to Montana to give lectures on Islam. He came here to retire.
After the peripatetic life of an embassy public affairs officer, he and his wife, Kathleen, a former UNICEF officer in India, moved in 1995 to Columbus, about 35 miles west of Billings. They have a 15-year-old son, Michael; Grimland also has a daughter, Debra, 36, in Atlanta.
Grimland and his wife built a house on land they bought in 1990, after friends visiting India from the States showed them photographs of the Montana property.
After the 2001 terrorist attacks, as he watched television news and took in what he describes as irregular coverage of the Muslim world in local newspapers, Grimland felt that Montanans were being given little true sense of that world.
“Islam, for most of us, didn’t really even register on our personal radar screens until Sept. 11, 2001,” he said.
“And since then, we’ve been assaulted with generally negative, often very violent images of the religion.”
Grimland does not remotely justify terrorism.
He does try to explain what motivates jihadists, and why some Muslims don’t condemn the violence.
“Many Muslims do perceive the U.S. as decadent and degenerate,” Grimland told the gathering here, referring to Janet Jackson’s exposed breast in the 2004 Super Bowl halftime show and TV’s “Desperate Housewives.”
When he filled in as a substitute history teacher at the Columbus high school, he said, he was shocked at how sexually suggestive some of student attire was.
Many in the audience here in Plentywood, seated on folding chairs, nodded.
Still, when it came time for questions, many also seemed to express polite skepticism about the Muslim world’s desire for peace.
“These moderates you’re talking about is there ever going to be an outcry from them, or do they secretly agree with this?” asked Betty Overland, a local banker. The “this” was the jihadists’ violence against Americans.
Grimland said that there were moderate Muslim voices but that they rarely got media coverage.
Bennie Lund, 78, a retired Plentywood elementary school teacher and wheat farmer who also once ran the local General Motors and Dairy Queen businesses, said he had a question.
“I was wondering about this plan to send 7,000 Iraqis over here now,” said Lund, referring to a Bush administration plan to provide asylum from worsening violence in Iraq.
“I’m wondering whether that’s a good idea or not at this particular time,” continued Lund, saying that some refugees might secretly harbor an inclination to violence toward America.
“How quickly can they be sent back?” he asked.
“Well, these are people who have worked with us, some of them,” Grimland said. “It might never be safe for them to return. We have an obligation ”
“Well, they’re going to have to be scrutinized very well,” Lund said. “That’s just common sense.”
Lund and his wife, Ann, said they had come to Grimland’s lecture because they were curious to hear the perspective of an American who had visited so many foreign countries something they had never been able to do.
Neither of them had ever even obtained a passport.
“We’ve always worked; we’ve always been busy,” said Ann Lund, 74.
“We never did have time to go to Europe or any of those places.”
Grimland’s low-key, low-tech presentations are backed with small grants for travel and other expenses from the Montana Committee for the Humanities.
Most everywhere he goes, Grimland seems to make it a point to listen as well as to speak.
While speaking on the Fort Peck reservation for the Sioux and Assiniboine tribes, he asked to meet with local leaders, just to get a sense of what was going on.
“I spent a lot of time abroad,” Grimland explained over breakfast one morning at the Buckhorn, an eatery in tiny Poplar, Mont., with ministers and tribal leaders. “I still have a lot to learn about my own country.”
An hour or so later, Grimland found himself an invited guest at a weekly meeting of the 15-member tribal council.
The leaders grilled him.
“This war in Iraq, the problem seems like it’s tribal, definitely tribal,” said Rick Kirn. “We know a bit about tribal conflicts.
“I’m not sure Bush was getting good advice on that when we went in.”
The discussion turned to the Islamic religion.
“You know, a wise man once taught something to me,” said council member Roxann Bighorn. “He said there are as many ways to pray as there are blades of grass.
“So we don’t denigrate anyone else’s religion.”
The subject turned to long-standing grievances. Another council member, Floyd Azure, pointed to a large framed print behind the chairman’s seat.
It depicts Mt. Rushmore and above Washington, Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt and Lincoln, the faces of four Native leaders hover in the clouds: Chief Joseph, Sitting Bull, Geronimo and Red Cloud.
The presidential carvings in the mountain, Azure said, are “a total slap in the face to the Sioux people.
That’s sacred ground to the Sioux. If I had my way, they wouldn’t be up there.”
Grimland said he first got the idea for his talks when the head of adult-education programs in Columbus asked him whether there was something to offer besides “the usual programs on computing, knitting, welding, yoga, etc.”
“I thought out loud with her [and] fairly quickly came up with the idea of a course on ‘basic Islam.’ I certainly wasn’t trying to convert anyone . I just wanted there to be a better understanding of the religion.”
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2007 JOHN HUMPHREY FREEDOM AWARD
Rights & Democracy is currently accepting nominations for the John Humphrey Freedom Award, which is presented every year to an organization or person who has made an outstanding contribution to the promotion of human rights and democratic development. The award consists of a grant of $25,000 as well as a speaking tour of Canadian cities to help increase awareness of the recipient’s human rights work. The deadline for nominations is April 15, 2007. To obtain information on eligibility criteria, consult our
Website: www.dd-rd.ca.
The Center for International Private Enterprise announces the
2007 International Essay Competition: Engaging Youth in Reform
Young people can be a powerful force for change! As future reformers, young people (18-30) have innovative ideas on how to solve the political, economic, and social problems facing their countries. However, they often lack the voice to bring these ideas to policymakers. Simply, young people are often regarded as recipients of reforms, not active participants in the reform process.
CIPEs essay contest gives you the opportunity to share your ideas about citizenship, democratic and market-oriented reform, youth leadership, and the ways that your country can create avenues for youth to participate in the political and economic spheres. We encourage you to get thinking, get involved, and use your own experiences to develop concrete solutions to these development issues.
A $1,000 honorarium will be given for each winning essay.
You can download a flyer about the contest, including guidelines, at http://www.cipe.org/programs/women/pdf/CIPEcontest.pdf
Visit the essay contest website at http://www.cipe.org/programs/women/essay.php
Eligibility
Open to students and young professionals aged 18-30. Special weight will be given to essays submitted by citizens of non-OECD countries.
Topic Categories
Citizenship in a Democratic Society
What needs to be done to develop a sense of citizenship in young people and help them find their role in a democratic society?
True reform occurs only when citizens actively participate in the governance process it cant be achieved by street protests alone. Young people are an integral part of society and their input and participation in their countries governance is necessary to effect political and economic reform. However, many lack the skills and opportunity to communicate with policymakers and get involved in their countrys development. Youth are often disengaged from the political process and rarely develop the sense of citizenship that is so crucial to building an inclusive, participatory democracy. To become active citizens in their countries, young people must have the skills to develop their ideas on reform and outlets to express those ideas in a constructive manner. What does citizenship mean to you? How are citizenship and good governance connected? How can your country engage and enable young people to participate constructively in the governance process? Be sure to begin your essay by describing the situation in your country.
Educational Reform and Employment Opportunities
How can your country reform the educational system to give young people the right skills and opportunities to enter the workforce?
In many countries, the youth unemployment rate is very high. In some countries, this is caused by a lack of jobs. However, in many others, young people entering the workforce are not prepared for the jobs available they lack the necessary skills and education. Unable to find good jobs, they face a difficult choice: remain unemployed or accept low-paying jobs with no opportunity for advancement. Improving the educational systems of many countries is a key step towards creating a generation of young people who possess the skills and knowledge to participate in the economy, locally and globally. What are the major employment problems young people face in your country? What can be done to give them the right skills and opportunities to enter the workforce? Who should taking the lead in doing so? Be sure to begin your essay by describing the situation in your country.
Entrepreneurship and Leadership
What needs to be done in your country to provide youth with the opportunity to become entrepreneurs and/or leaders in their communities?
Young people can play a positive role in the political and economic spheres in their countries, on both local and national levels. Unfortunately they often lack access to the resources and groups that would help them get involved and have an impact. However, when provided with the opportunity and skills to become influential members of their communities, youth can accomplish their goals. What are the skills that young people need to acquire to start a successful business or civil society group? What are the major barriers that prevent them from opening a business or assuming a leadership position in your country? What programs or policies would give youth the skills to become active and influential members of society? Be sure to begin your essay by describing the situation in your country.
Top Essays
In each category, a first, second, and third place winner will be chosen by a panel of CIPE staff and international partners. The three winning essays from each category will be published as Economic Reform Feature Service articles. CIPE will provide each of the nine winners an honorarium of $1,000.
Other essays of merit will be considered for publication as well. CIPE may translate certain articles into other languages, including Arabic, Russian, Spanish, or French.
Judging Criteria
Essays will be judged on clarity, originality, and their contribution to the understanding of development issues facing countries. The logic of the ideas expressed is more important than perfect English grammar.
Judges: Essays will be evaluated by a panel of judges comprising CIPE staff and CIPEs international partners.
About CIPE
The Center for International Private Enterprise is a non-profit affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and one of the four core institutes of the National Endowment for Democracy. CIPE has supported more than 1,000 local initiatives in over 100 developing countries, involving the private sector in policy advocacy and institutional reform, improving governance, and building understanding of market-based democratic systems.
CIPE maintains that countries need to build market-oriented and democratic institutions simultaneously, as they are essentially two sides of the same coin. Without a functioning market system, democracies will remain weak. Likewise, without a democratic process, economic reforms are unlikely to succeed.
For more information about CIPE, please visit www.cipe.org
Formatting Guidelines
All essays must be written in English.
All essays must be original and unpublished.
Word count: 2,000-4,000.
Indicate the essays category on the cover page.
Provide full contact info on the cover page, including citizenship.
Deadline
All essays must be submitted by May 31, 2007.
How to Submit
E-mail a copy of the essay as a .pdf file or MS Word document to essay@cipe.org
An e-mail will be sent confirming receipt of the submission.
DISCLAIMER:
The articles in this bulletin do NOT necessarily reflect the opinions of CSID, or its board of directors. They are included in the CSID bulletin to encourage and facilitate diversity of opinions, discussions, and debates about democracy in the Arab/Muslim world, and how best to strengthen and promote it.
